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FOREWORD 
Harmonization  of  value-added  tax  is  one  of  the  key  aspects  of  creating  a 
uniform  internal  market  within  the  Community.  Recent  problems  have  high-
lighted  the  difficulties  that  still  have  to  be  overcome  if obstacles  to the 
harmonization  of  value-added  tax  are  to  be  removed.  The  present  study 
discusses  the  economic  problems  of  value-added  tax  harmonization.  Its  aim  is 
to  go  beyond  the  everyday  practicalities  and  to  present  considerations  of 
principle  and  analyses  of  the  economic  problems  arising  in  connection  with 
value-added tax harmonization. 
This  paper  obviously  reflects  the  personal  views  of  the  author  and  not  those 
of the European  Parliament as  an  institution. 
Any  remarks  or enquiries regarding this paper  should be addressed to: 
European  Parliament 
DG  IV,  Schuman  6/73 
L  - 2929  LUXEMBOURG 
Tel:  (00352)  4300-2920 
Fax:  (00352)  43  40  71 - 5  -
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INTRODUCTION 
If one were to believe the newspaper  headlines1,  the  1992  internal market will 
not  be  completed  on  schedule  by  the  end  of  1992  despite  the  efforts  of  all 
those  involved.  The  discussions on the removal  of the last borders within the 
European  internal  market  would  not  appear  to  be  making  any  headway,  at  least 
in  the  case  of  fiscal  barriers.  Since  the  Commission  presented  an  ambitious 
programme  in its 1985  White  Paper2,  the  issu~ of fiscal barriers has  been much 
more  hotly debated than those of physical  and technical  barr~ers together. 
This  is  hardly  surprising  since  there  are  conflicting  considerations  and 
interests  to  be  reconciled:  in  principle,  all those  involved  are opposed  to 
border  tax  adjustments  whereby  the  exporting  country  exempts  all  goods  from 
its  tax  and  the  importing  country  levies  a  tax  at  the  same  rate  as  for 
domestic  products  on  all  goods.  Such  a  system  is costly  in  terms  of  delays 
for  transporters  and  industry,  and  the  administrative  formalities  it entails 
for  government;  it  is  frequently  used  as  a  means  of  protecting  domestic 
industry  (non-tariff  barriers  to  trade)  and  is  generally  regarded  as 
incompatible with  a  single internal market.  At  the  same  time,  however: 
2 
France  is  not  prepared  to  accept  any  loss  of  tax  revenue  as  a  result  of 
harmonization of tax rates, 
The  United  Kingdom  wishes  to  maintain  its widespread  zero  rating of  basic 
necessities, 
German  industry does  not  want to be burdened with further red tape, 
cf.  ZEIT  (1988),  Binnenmarkt  Steuer  ale  Bremse  (Internal  market-
taxation as  a  brake),  Die  Zeit  Nr.  38,  16  September  1988,  p.  24 
cf.  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  (1985),  Completing the  internal 
market,  White  Paper  from  the Commission to the European Council,  Luxembourg - 8  -
The  Danish  and Belgian retail trade in frontier areas does not want to lose 
business  constantly  as  a  result  of  consumers  shopping  in  neighbouring 
countries with  lower tax rates, 
The  Italian  inland  revenue  authorities  have  no  wish  to  ·encourage  tax 
evasion merely to complete the internal market. 
An  impossible undertaking?3 
Hence  the  need  for  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  economic  aspects  of  tax 
harmonization,  since  the  problem  is  often  approached  without  taking  all 
economic  models  and proposals  into account.  Harmonization is also erroneously 
equated  with  equalization  of  tax  rates.  Conversely,  it is also  important  to 
take  into  account  proposals  put  forward  in the current debate,  which at first 
sight  would  appear  to provide  simple  and  convincing  solutions to the problem, 
e.g.  the  abolition  of  border  tax  adjustments  with  parallel  adjustments  in 
exchange rates. 
Discussion  of  fiscal  barriers  is  focussed  primarily  on  indirect  taxes.  The 
reason  why  the present paper deals solely with the value  added tax,  is that in 
all  traditional  areas  of  public  finance  alloc.ation,  distribution  and 
stability  - it plays  a  more  important  and  proportionately  greater  role  than 
specific  excise  duties.  However  a  number  of  the  arguments  and  conclusions 
also hold true  for  specific excise duties. 
This  study  has  two  important  features:  firstly  it is  an  interdisciplinary 
approach  since  the  topic  covers  two  normally  separate  fields  of  economics, 
namely  international  economics  and  public  finance.  In  a  work  of this kind it 
is clearly  not  feasible  to  separate the  two  issues.  Secondly,  the results of 
the  analysis  will  primarily  serve  to  assess  a  number  of  proposals  and 
mechanisms. 
3  Particularly  since  harmonization  of  indirect  taxation  pursuant  to Article 
99  of  the  EEC  Treaty  requires  a  unanimous  decision  by  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  cf.  EWG-VERTRAG.  GRUNDLAGE  DER  EUROPAISCHEN  GEMEINSCHAFT 
(1987),  text  of  the  EEC  Treaty  and  supplementary  provisions  as  at  1  July 
1987  edited  and  introduced  by  Thomas  Laufer,  published  for  the  Federal 
Office  for  Political  Studies,  Europa  Union  Verlag,  Bonn,  second  edition, 
December  1987 - 9  -
These  two  features  are  not  new  and  can  be  found  in  the  large  volume  of 
literature  on  this  subject.  However,  this  paper  attempts  to  incorporate  and 
to  give  greater  emphasis  to  certain  wider  issues.  These  are  factors  such  as 
labour  and  capital  mobility  and  the  effects  of  tax  harmonization  on the  role 
of  fiscal  policy,  which  ia  changing  following  the  greater  degree  of 
convergence  of  economic  policies.  At  the  same  time greater stress is placed 
on welfare theory considerations and the normative aspects of the problem. 
Following  a  short  conceptual,  factual  and  quantitative  definition  of  the 
value-added  tax  and  its  previous  harmonization  in  section  A,  section  B  sets 
out  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  taxation  of  international  trade  and 
analyses  them  by  means  of  a  simple  general  equilibrium model  since without  an 
understanding  of  these  principles  it  is  impossible  to  assess  the  tax 
harmonization proposals  and their effects.  The  proposals themselves  and their 
basic mechanisms  are presented in section c.  Section D then goes  on to give  a 
comparative  analysis  of  their  wider  implications  leading  to  conclusions  that 
can  be  applied  to  the  removal  of  fiscal  frontiers.  Section  E  discusses 
aspects arising  from  the theory of  second-best. 
A.  THE  HARMONIZATION  OF  VALUE-ADDED-TAX  - DEVELOPMENT,  STRUCTURES  AND  CONCEPTS 
I.  The tax harmonization debate in the European Community 
The  activities  carried  out  by  the  public  sector  vary  considerably  from  one 
Member  State  of  the  Community  to  another  in  terms  of  nature  and  quantity, 
mainly  for historical reasons.  However,  as  a  result of  increasing integration 
this divergence  has  become  the target of widespread criticism and  simultaneous 
calls for  'harmonization'. 
Nonetheless,  in  the  chorus  of  calls  for  harmonization  it  has  often  been 
difficult  to  make  out  what  exactly  should  be  understood  by  the  term 
harmonization  in  practice,  although  the  need  for  harmonization  has  almost 
always  been  justified on the grounds  of distortion of competition. - 10  -
Harmonization  was  presented,  for  instance,  in  terms  of  an  equal  government 
share  of  gross  national  product  or  an  equal  ratio  of  direct  to  indirect 
taxation.  In many  cases the demands  also extended to tax systems;  for example 
insistence  that  the  same  types  of  taxes  should  be  imposed  in  all  Member 
States4•  Moreover,  there were  even  aome calls for  identical tax rates. 
As  regards  the  harmonization  of  taxes  in  the  Community,  the  ratio  between 
direct  and  indirect  taxation  is  a  secondary  issue.  In  the  forefront  of  the 
debate  is the distortion of  resource  allocation resulting  from  differences  in 
the  level  and  nature of direct or indirect taxation. 
While  direct  taxation  and  social  security  levies  are  relevant  in  the 
international  context  primarily  because  of  their  effect  on  the  location  of 
production,  in  the  case  of  indirect  taxes  it is important to ensure that tax 
systems  are  mutually  compatible  in  the  case  of  international  transactions. 
Both  double  taxation  and  immunity  from  taxat.ion  and  the resulting distortions 
of trade and  competition are to be  avoided. 
In  international  trade  and  within the  Community  this is generally achieved by 
means  of  a  border  tax  adjustment  designed  to  ensure that  imported  goods  bear 
the  same  tax as domestically produced goods. 
Furthermore the main goal of completion of the Community  internal market  is to 
create  a  single  market  without  fiscal  barriers.  Hence  the  problem  of  tax 
harmonization  can  be  seen  from  another  angle,  'harmonization  is  advocated  as 
an  instrument  by  which  a  desired  objective  (the  abolition  of  frontier 
controls)  can be  achieved,  rather than as  anend  in itself.•5 
Consequently,  there  is  a  need  for  a  taxation principle that  avoids costly and 
time-consuming  border  controls  and  is  neutral  in  its  effects  on  revenue 
4 
5 
The  debate  on  the  potentially adverse effects  on  competition of  the German 
'Gewerbesteuer'  is a  good  example 
LEE,  PEARSON  and  SMITH  (1988),  Fiscal  harmonization:  An  analysis  of  the 
European  Commission's  proposals.  The  Institute for Fiscal Studies,  London, 
p.  10.  Italics as  in original. - 11  -
allocation6 •  These  considerations  possibly  constitute  an  argument  in  favour 
of the harmonization of tax structures and rates. 
Even  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  is not  necessarily  aiming  for 
complete  equalization  of  tax  rates.  Instead,  its  objective  is  merely  the 
minimum  degree  of  harmonization  required  to  complete  the  internal  market, 
while  minimizing  possible  distortions  in  the  allocation  of  revenue.  tt 
therefore quite rightly talks of  'approximation' 7  and  not of harmonization. 
The  following  section  gives  a  brief  review  of  the  development  and 
characteristics of the value-added tax. 
II.  Development,  characteristics  and  significance of the present value-added 
tax  (VAT) 
1.  From  a  gross turnover tax to a  value-added tax 
When  the Treaty of  Rome  was  signed in 1957  by the six founder  Member  States of 
the  community  - Belgium,  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  France,  Italy, 
Luxembourg  and  the Netherlands  - the primary  aim was  to create a  common  market 
by  abolishing  import  duties  within  the  Community.  This  was  achieved  on 
1  July 1968.  However,  it did  not  bring  about  a  common  market  since there was 
neither  freedom  of  movement  for  production  factors  - labour  and  capital - nor 
free  and  unrestricted trade. 
6 
7 
The  cost  of  border  adjustments  in  terms  of  domestic  administrative 
formalities  and  delays  for  industry  has  been  estimated at  some  8  bn  ECU  or 
about,  2%  of  intra-Community  trade  in  value.  In  addition  there  is  lost 
turnover  of  between  4.5  and  15  bn  ECU  and  public  expenditure of  somewhere 
between  0.5  and  1  bn  ECU.  See  CECCHINI  (1988), 'Europa  '92:  Oer  Vorteil 
des  Binnenmarktes  (The  advantage  of  the  internal  market),  Nomos 
Ver1agsgesel1schaft,  Baden-Baden,  p.  28.  For  a  detailed  presentation  of 
the  results  cf.  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  (1988),  The 
economics  of  1992,  European  Economy  No.  35. 
COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  (1985),  p.  44. - 12  -
At  that time the  types  of  general  sales taxes varied  from  one Member  State to 
another8 •  Although  all  the  Member  States  applied  a  multistage  tax  which, 
unlike  the  single-stage retail  sales tax  in the  USA,  applied to all stages of 
production  (excluding  the  retail  trade),  in  all  the  Community  States  except 
France the tax was  a  gross turnover tax. 
This  system  taxes  at  each  stage  of  production the value  added  plus the gross 
input value with  a  cumulative effect.  A tax of this kind creates considerable 
distortions  firstly  since  the  final  tax  component  depends  on  the  number  of 
stages  of  production,  the  negative  effect  of  this  being  to  promote  vertical 
integration,  and  secondly,  because the relative prices of products also depend 
on the  number  of stages of production. 
France was  the only country to apply a  'net turnover tax'  in which the element 
taxed  at  each  stage  of  production  was  the  added  value  rather  than  turnover 
itself.  A  'net  turnover  tax'  at  all  stages  of  the  production. of  consumer 
goods  is  a  consumption-type  value-added tax  which,  at  a  given rate,  imposes  a 
tax burden equivalent to that of  a  sales tax9 • 
Consequently,  as  long  ago  as  1963,  the Fiscal  and  Finance  Committee set up by 
the  European  Commission  and  chaired  by  Fritz  Neumark10  advocated  the 
introduction of  a  value-added tax in all Member  States. 
In  order  to  calculate  the  VAT  amount  which  has  to  be  paid  by  the  firm  there 
exists  two  procedures,  both  are  subtractive  methods  in  nature.  In  the  tax-
base-on-tax-base  deduction,  the  value  of  the  inputs,  is  deducted  from  the 
total  turnover  of  a  firm  and  the tax  rate  ~s applied to the net  product.  In 
the tax credit  system,  the  arithmetical tax liability,  the product  of the tax 
8 
9 
cf.  CNOSSEN  and  SHOUP  (1987),  'Coordination  of  value-added  taxes',  in 
CNOSSEN  (ed.),  Tax  coordination  in  the  European  Community,  Kluwer  Law  and 
Taxation Publishers,  Deventer,  pp.  59-84;  here pp.  60-65 
cf.  MUSGRAVE,  MUSGRAVE  and  KULLMER  ( 1985),  Die  offentlichen  Finanzen  in 
Theorie  und  Praxis,  (Public  finance  in theory  and  practice),  Volume  2,  3rd 
edition,  Mohr,  Tlibingen,  pp.  300-302 
10  cf.  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  (1962),  Report of the Fiscal and 
Finance Committee  (Neumark  Report),  p.  46. - 13  -
rate  multiplied  by  total  turnover  (excluding  tax),  can  be  reduced  by 
deducting the tax previously paid on the purchase of inputs. 
Provided  that  a  single  tax  rate  is  applied  at  all  stages,  both  procedures 
result  in  the  same  tax  burden11 •  At  the  same  time it is possible to make  an 
exact  calculation  of  the  tax  previously  paid  at  each  stage  of  processing, 
thereby permitting  an  accurate border tax  adjustment with the  refund of input 
tax  and  zero-rating of exports.  This is the advantage of  a  value-added tax. 
Pursuant to the two  Council directives of  1967,  all the Member  States have  now 
introduced  a  value-added tax with deduction of  input tax  (VAT). 12 
The  Sixth  VAT  Directive  of  1977  attempted,  inter  alia,  to  create  a  uniform 
basis  of  assessment.  This  included  the  establishment  of  rules  on  tax 
liability,  defining  turnover  which  is  taxable  and  defining  the  tax  base13• 
However,  the  directive  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  rules  on  exemptions. 
Necessities  such  as  medicinal  products,  postal  services,  books,  education, 
social  and  cultural  activities  and  also  insurance  and  banking  services  are 
11  cf.  NOWOTNY  ( 1987),  Der  Offentliche  Sektor,  EinfUhrung  in  die 
F inanzw  is  senschaft  (The  public  sector,  introduction  to  public  finance) , 
with  Christian  Scheer  and  Herbert  Walther,  Springer  Verlag,  Berlin, 
Heidelberg,  p.  224.  Differences  between  the  two  procedures  arise  when 
different  tax  rates  or  tax  exemptions  are  applied  at  the  various  stages. 
In  the  case  of  a  tax-base-on-tax-base  deduction  the tax  burden is derived 
from  the  sum  of  the  value  added  at  each  stage  multiplied  by  the  relevant 
tax  rate,  in  the  case  of  the  tax  credit  system  (also tax-on-tax  deduction 
system or deduction of  input tax)  the final tax burden is equivalent to the 
net  price  to  the  final  consumer  multiplied  by  the  tax  rate  at  the  last 
stage.  Exemptions  or  different  rates  at  earlier  stages  are offset by  the 
deduction  of  tax  previously  paid.  This  phenomenon  is referred to  as  the 
'catching-up-effect'  of the value-added tax with deduction of  input tax. 
12  cf.  CNOSSEN  and  SHOUP  (1987),  p.  62  et seq. 
13  cf.  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  (1980),  Report  on  the  scope  for 
convergence  of  tax  systems  in  the  Community,  Bulletin  of  the  European 
Communities,  Supplement  1/80,  p.  26 - 14  -
generally  subject to  a  reduced  rate.  In the United  Kingdom  a  zero-rating was 
even applied14 • 
2 .  Present  VAT  structures  and  rates  and  their  implications  for  the  national 
budgets 
Although  all  the  Members  States  have  now  implemented  the  same  type of  value-
added  tax,  there are currently considerable differences  in the  VAT  structure, 
i.e.  the  number  of  rates,  the  goods  subject  to  the  various  rates,  the  rate 
levels and  the degree of  zero rating. 
Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom  apply  a  single  (standard)  rate,  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Ireland  and  Luxembourg  apply  a  standard 
rate  plus  one  or  two  reduced  rates.  Spain,  Portugal,  Italy,  France,  Greece 
and  Belgium  have  not  only the  standard rate  and  the  reduced rate but also one 
or  two  higher  rates  on  luxury  goods  such  as  cars,  jewellery,  perfume  and 
yachts15 • 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  although  there  is  only  one  standard  rate  and  no 
reduced  rate,  many  goods  are  zero  rated,  as  is  the  case  to  a  much  lesser 
extent  in  Ireland,  Italy,  Portugal,  Denmark  and  Belgium.  The  significance 
and  extent  of  zero  rating  is clearly reflected  in  the  proportion  of  the  VAT 
tax  base  accounted  for  by  such  goods.  In  the  United  Kingdom  the  value  of 
zero  rated  goods  accounts  for  some  40\  of  the  tax  base,  whereas  the 
proportion  accounted  for  by  the  reduced  rate  in  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany  is only about  20\16 • 
14  Zero-rating  can  be  interpreted  as  tax  exemption  at  the  final  stage  with 
the  refund  of  input  tax,  hence  the  product  is  not  taxed.  Special 
arrangements  for  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  and  agriculture  are 
not  discussed  here. 
15  For  the  structure,  levels  and  quantitative  significance  of  VAT  in  the 
Community  Member  States  see  Tables  in  Annex  I.  For  details of  the  goods 
subject to higher rates Cf  CNOSSEN  and  SHOUP  (1987),  p.  66. 
16  Cf  Ibid,  p  66 - 15  -
The  level  of  tax  rates  also  varies  considerably.  The  most  important,  the 
standard rate,  ranges  from  12\ in Luxembourg  and Spain to 25\  in Ireland17 • 
The  significance  of  VAT  revenue  in  terms  of  total  tax  revenue  or  GNP  also 
varies  from  one  Member  state to another.  It accounts  for between 11.9' 
(Luxembourg)  and  33.5\  (France),  of  total  tax  revenue  and  between  5.3\ 
(Italy)  and  9.8\  (Denmark)  of GNP. 
B.  THE  THEORY  OF  TAXATION  OF  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE 
I. Methodology 
1.  Selection of the incidence concept 
As  a  rule  the  taxpayer  is  not  the  economic  entity which  bears  the  economic 
burden  of  taxation,  a  factor  that  must  be  borne  in  mind  in  any  public 
economics  analysis.  This  is also true for  any  type of general sales tax.  It 
is  therefore  interesting  to  look  at  the  implications,  in  terms  of  price  and 
quantity  effects,  of  the  various  tax  rates  in  the  Member  States  concerned. 
This  is also referred to as  the problem of  incidence. 
One  of the main  questions arising in assessing the distributional effects'of a 
tax,  concerns  the  expenditure  side  of  the  national  budget.  The  extent  to 
which  the  expenditure  side  is  taken  into  account  is  also  reflected  in  the 
three possible  incidences.  Whereas  the  revenue  or tax  incidence  relates only 
to the revenue  side and  the expenditure incidence only to the· expenditure side 
of  the budget,  the budget  incidence takes both sides into account18• 
Since  an  analysis  of  a  value-added  tax  in  international  trade  is  primarily 
concerned  with  the  trade  and  direct  income  effects  resulting  from  price 
17  The  rates exclude tax i.e. they apply to the net price of goods 
18  For details of the  incidence concepts,  see  NOWOTNY  (1987),  pp.  309-327 - 16  -
changes,  there  is  every  reason  for  selecting  the  concept  of  revenue 
incidence. 
Although  as  a  whole  this  analysis  is  based  on  a  number  of  restric-
tive assumptions,  the  initially highly  simplified  and  rather  systematic  model 
will  be  extended  from  a  formal  to  an  effective  incidence  approach.  A 
justification  for  this  approach  is  given  in  the  paper  by  Dieter  BIEHL: 
"despite  these  limitations,  the  approach  used  here  is  valuable  in  that  it 
demonstrates  that  very  differentiated  results  are  obtained  even  under 
extremely  simplified  assumptions  and  'ideal'  theoretical  comparative  static 
conditions19 • 
The  basis  for  this  analysis  is  a  Pareto  optimal  situation,  which  is  one  of 
non-taxation.  This  demonstrates  the effects of various  tax principles before 
analysing the effects of  a  changeover  from the existing system with border tax 
adjustments to an alternative system. 
In  parallel,  the  types  of  general  sales  tax  discussed  are  widened  from  a 
single  stage  production  tax  in  this  section  to the consideration of  a  value-
added tax  in section c. 
2.  The  Model 
The  initial assumptions  are that there  is equilibrium between the  two  or more 
states  and  that  all  factors  of  production  are  fully  employed  but,  unlike the 
goods,  not  traded  internationally.  On  the  assumption  that  the economies  are 
operating with given resources,  it follows that the factor  supply is fixed20 • 
19  BIEHL  (1989),  Ausfuhrland-Prinzip,  Einfuhrland-Prinzip  und  Gemeinsamer-
Markt-Prinzip.  Ein  Beitrag  zur  Theorie  der  Steuerharmonisierung,  (Export 
country principle,  import country principle and  common  market principle - a 
contribution  to  the  theory  of  tax  harmonization)  Carl  Heymanns  Verlag. 
Koln,  p.  316.  Translation of the quotation was  made  by the author. 
20  Later  in this paper  the effect of this  assumption  on  the allocation of tax 
revenue  will  become  clear.  The  assumption  of  internationally  fixed 
production  factors  is abandoned  in section D.  I.  1 - 17  -
In  accordance  with  BIEHL,  this chapter  examines  the principles of taxation on 
the basis  of  two  simple  and  clear variants of tax  incidence,  namely where tax 
is shifted backwards  and where  tax is shifted forward. 
In  the  second  case  all  prices  rise  by  exactly  the  nominal  amount  of  tax  so 
that  the  general  price  level  rises  by  the  tax  rate.  In  the  framework  of  a 
partial  equilibrium  analysis,  thi•  case  can  be  equated  with  an  inelastic 
demand  curve  with  respect  to the  price.  The  tax burden  is borne  exclusively 
by  the consumer  and producer prices correspond to the equilibrium price before 
the  imposition of taxation. 
Since the  income  of  the  consumer  remains  constant,  but  prices  have risen,  the 
tax  affects  the  spending  of  private  households.  The  nominal  value  of  the 
national  product  rises  by  the  tax  rate  multiplied  by  the  previous  national 
product21 • 
identical. 
The  tax  means  that  consumer  and  producer  prices  are  no  longer 
Conversely,  where  tax  is  shifted  backwards,  the  tax  is  not  added  to  the 
previous  price  but  is  passed  on  by  reducing  the  remuneration  of  all  factors 
of  production.  This  case  corresponds  to  an  inelastic  supply  curve.  Consumer 
prices,  and  thus  the general  price  level,  remain  constant  but  producer prices 
fall  by  the  amount  of  the  tax22 • 
households  are cut at source. 
In  this  case  the  incomes  of  private 
To  be  able  to  assess  the  effect  of taxation  in the  international context,  it 
therefore  has  to  be  verified  whether  the  relevant  national  demand  and  supply 
structures  change.  It  must  therefore  be  assumed  that  in  both  cases  - tax 
shifted  backwards  or  forwards  - the  tax  does  not  affect  the  individual's 
labour  supply  decision or  the  range  of  products  purchased  by  a  representative 
21  Cf  BIEHL  ( 1969),  p.  319  et  seq.,  appropriate  adjustments  in  the  money 
supply are assumed. 
2 2  Cf  Ibid  p.  370  the  flexibility  of  all  prices  is  a  necessary  although 
restrictive assumption  here. - 18  -
private  household.  on  the  assumption  that  government  spending  offsets  the 
reduction in private demand,  overall demand  and  supply remain constant.23 
It  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  how  complicated  the analysis  become•  when  the 
tax  is  not  fully  shifted,  or  not  shifted in the  same  way  in all markets or in 
the  same  way  at home  and  abroad. 
The  border  tax  adjustments  made  in  practice  are  based  on  a  similar 
restrictive  assumption.  Only  if  supply  and  demand  elasticities are the  same 
in  both  countries  will  the  border  tax  adjustment  even  out prices.  A  uniform 
price  cannot  be  guaranteed  unless  the  respective  degree  of  distortion  is 
exactly offset24 • 
2 3  See  Tresh:  'Harberger,  and  others,  actually  assume  that  the  government 
spends  the  revenue  exactly  as  the  consumer(&)  would  have  had  they received 
it,  but  this  is  equivalent  to  redistributing  the  revenue  lump  sum  and 
letting  the  consumer(s)  spend  it'  from  TRESH  (1981),  Public  Finance: 
A  normative  analysis,  Business Publications,  Plano,  p.  380 et seq. 
24  Cf.  PEFFEKOVEN  (1983),  'Probleme  der  internationalen  Finanzordnung' 
(Problems  of  international  fiscal  relations),  in  Andel  et  al.  (Ed): 
Handbuch  der  Finanzwissenachaft,  (Handbook  of  Public  Finance)  Volume  4, 
third edition  ,  TUbingen,  pp.  219-268;  particularly p.  232  et seq.  From  a 
purely  theoretical  point  of  view,  it  appears  necessary  to  drop  the 
assumption  of  equal  elasticities,  but  a  system  of  adjustment  based  on  it-
using  adjusted  tax  rates  or  the  exchange  rate  - would  be  highly  confused 
and  economically  impractical  to  implement  and  monitor  and  politically 
unacceptable.  The  consideration  of  variance  of  the  tax  incidence  serves 
however to illustrate polar elasticity. - 19  -
The  exchange  rate  between  the  two  countries  is determined  by  real  purchasing 
power,  i.e.  the  !comparative  price  levels25 •  We  refrain  from  transportation 
costs. 
II.  Taxation principles and their international incidence 
1.  Fundamental  principles in a  two-country  framework 
Before  going  on  to  analyse  practical  proposals  for  removing  fiscal  frontiers 
in the  next  chapter,  it is necessary to clarify the  fundamental  principles of 
the taxation of  international trade.  The  basic considerations are as  follows: 
In  the case of  a  single-stage production tax,  i.e.  producers  in the exporting 
country  supply  the  consumer  in  the  importing  country  directly  without  any 
further processing.  There  are four conceivable taxation scenarios: 26 
Case  1:  If the exporting country taxes exports and the importing country taxes 
imports  there  is double  taxation.  As  a  result  imported  goods  are relatively 
more  expensive  in the  importing country than similar domestic goods.  There is 
discrimination against exports. 
Case  2:  If  neither  the  exporting  nor  the  importing country tax  foreign  trade 
there  is  immunity  from  taxation.  Such  a  situation  is extremely  unrealistic 
25  This is also referred to as naive purchasing power parity theory.  Cf.  ROSE 
(1986)  Theorie  der  Au,Benwirtschaft  (Theory  of  international  economics), 
9th Edition,  Verlag  Vahlen,  Munich,  pp.  93  et seq.  Although it is usually 
assumed  that  flexible  exchange  rates  are  incompatible  with  the  single 
internal  market,  the  exchange  rate  here  is  assumed  to be  flexible.  Since 
the  existing  European  Monetary  System  (EMS)  allows  the  realignment  of 
exchange  rates,  the  assumptions  of  the  model  can  be  justified  and  the 
economic  effect  must  be  regarded  as  equivalent.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
achievement  of  monetary  union  with  a  single  central  bank  and  one  currency 
is  not  foreseeable  in  the  medium-term.  Otherwise  proposals  based  on 
exchange  rate  adjustments  had  to  be  excluded.  Cf  EG-MAGAZIN  (1988)  'Der 
Binnenmarkt  1992  braucht  nicht notwendigerweise eine einheitliche Wihrung'. 
Ein  Interview mit  Prof.  Leonard  Gleske,  (The  1992  internal market  does  not 
necessarily  need  a  single  currency.  An  interview  with  Professor  Leonard 
Gleske)in:  EG-Magazin,  Issue of  7/8 July 1988,  pp.  30-33. 
26  Cf.  PEFFEKOVEN  (1983),  p.  221. - 20  -
since  the  national  exchequers'  primary  concern  is  to  increase  their·· tax 
revenue.  Moreover  the  situation  is  the  exact  opposite  of  Case  1  in  that 
imports  would  be  favoured  since  they  would  be  cheaper  than  similar 
domestically produced goods. 
Case  3:  If  the  importing, country  taxes  its  imports  and  the exporting country 
does  not  tax  its  exports  there  is  neither  double  taxation  nor  tax  immunity. 
This is referred to as the destination principle. 
Case  4: 
principle. 
The  last  possible  scenario  is  the  reverse  of  the  destination 
The  exporting  country  taxes  exports  but  the  importing  country 
allows  imports to enter free of tax.  This is the origin principle. 
Since the last two  options are probably the only methods of taxation which are 
neutral  in  terms  of  allocation  and  yet  generate  a  positive tax revenue,  they 
will  now  be  examined  in greater detail27 • 
a.  Destination principle 
aa.  variant A:  Tax  shifted forward 
Under  the  destination  principle  no  tax  is  levied  on  exports.  Instead  the 
importing  country  levies  a  tax  on  the  net  value of  the  imports  (compensatory 
import  tax)  at  its  national  rate.  Consumer.  prices  rise  by  the  tax  rate tj, 
(country  j  =  A,B)  multiplied  by  the  producer  price.  This  method ensures that 
all  goods  consumed  in  a  given  country  are  taxed  at  the  same  domestic  rate 
irrespective of where they were  produced. 
27  The  breakdown  is  taken  from  ROBSON  (1984),  The  economics  of  international 
integration,  2nd edition,  London,  pp.  94 et seq. - 21  -
Since  there  is  no  change  in relative prices  for  consumers  or producers within 
the  two  countries,  nor  any  change  in  the  trade  balance,  the  equilibrium  is 
maintained after tax28 •  The  exchange rate remains constant. 
This  system permits the countries  involved to apply different tax rates,  which 
affect  their  domestic  consumers  only.  At  the  same  time it is clear that the 
consumer's  choice  of  domestic  or  foreign  products  does  not  affect  the 
allocation  of  tax  revenue  between  the  two  countries.  The  tax  always  accrues 
to the country where the goods  are consumed  (importing country). 
However,  the  system requires  a  border tax adjustment. 
ab.  Variant  B:  Tax  shifted backwards 
Where  tax  is  shifted  backwards,  the  producer  price,  and  with  it all  factor 
incomes,  falls  by  the  tax  factor  1/(l+t.j),  (j  =  A,B),  so  that  the  consumer 
price  remains  the  same.  The  border  tax  adjustments  in  the  case  of 
international trade where  there are different tax rates  results in a  relative 
shift  in  price  on  the  producer  side:  exports  from  the  high  tax  country  are 
relatively cheaper compared with goode  produced  in the  low tax country and its 
imports  are  comparatively  dearer. 
goods  in the  low  tax country. 
Consequ~ntly all  producers  want  to  sell 
This  will  tend  to  lead  to  a  trade  imbalance  since  in  the  high  tax  country 
exports will  increase  and  imports  fall.  This  will therefore be  followed  by a 
corresponding revaluation of the high tax country's currency. 
b.  Origin principle 
ba.  variant A:  Tax  shifted forward 
In  this  case  the  tax  levied  leads  to  differences  between  consumer  and 
producer  prices  in  each  country.  Whereas  producer  prices  are  the  same 
internationally  at  a  given  exchange  rate  this  no  longer  applies  to  consumer 
28  On  the  assumption  of  constant  demand  and  supply  structures,  the volume  of 
goods  exported  and  imported  remains  constant.  Cf.  comments  on  the results 
in subsection B.II.I.  Annex  2. - 22  -
prices  where  tax  rates  vary.  Since  consumer  prices  correspond  to prices  in 
transfrontier trade - no  border tax adjustments being made  - distortions will 
arise  since  the  exports  (imports)  of  the  high-tax  country  are  relatively 
dearer  (cheaper)  than goods  in the  low-tax country. 
This  results  in  a  trade  deficit  for  the  high-tax  country.  Adjustments  will 
then occur  in the monetary sphere.  The  currency of the high-tax country would 
tend to depreciate  and the trade balance to be corrected. 
Contrary  to  the  destination  principle,  all  tax  revenue  will  accrue  to  the 
producing  country  (exporting  country).  The  origin  principle  is  often 
advocated  however  on the grounds that no border tax adjustment is required29 • 
bb.  Variant  B:  Tax  shifted backwards 
However,  if  the  tax  is  passed  on  to  factors  of  production,  consumer  prices 
remain  the  same  and  producer  prices  fall  by  the  tax  factor  1/(1+tj)'  (j  = 
A, B).  Since  we  are  concerned,  as  above,  with  tax  inclusive prices  in cross-
border trade,  trade  between  the countries  involved will  remain  in balance and 
there will  be  no  exchange  rate change.  Producers will  be unconcerned whether 
their products are sold on the domestic market or abroad. 
2.  The  general  equivalence  of  the  deatination  principle  and  the  origin 
principle in a  two-country  framework 
On  the  assumptions  made  above  it  can  be  shown  that  where  a  general  tax  is 
levied with tax shifted forward  or backwards,  no distortions of competition or 
disequilibrium  in  the  trade  balance  will  result  either  in  the  case  of  the 
destination  principle  or  in  the  case  of  the  origin  principle.  This  is 
because  the  different  tax  levels  are  offset  by  a  tax  adjustment  (border  tax 
adjustment)  or by  monetary changes  (adjustment  in exchange rates). 
29  Cf.  BERGLAS  (1981),  "Harmonization of commodity taxes.  Destination,  origin 
and  restricted origin  principles",  Journal  of  Public  Economics  16,  p.  386 
and  ROBSON  (1984),  p.  104. - 23  -
On  the  basis  of  these  assumptions,  the  destination  p~inciple and  the  origin 
principle  must  be  regarded  as  equivalent.  This  implies  that it is possible 
to  switch  from  one  to  the  other  without  causing  distortions  since  any  such 
change would  also be  accompanied  by  a  corresponding adjustment30• 
As  a  first  step  to  a  more  realistic  assessment  of  the  situation,  it  is 
necessary  to  turn  from  a  two-country  framework,  in  which  both  countries  are 
members  of the Common  Market,  to a  framework  involving several countries. 
So  far  the destination principle and  the origin principle have  been discussed 
in  their  pure  form  where  no  other  countries  or  no  countries  which  are  not 
members  of the Community  were  involved. 
However  since the European  Community  does  not  include all the countries in the 
world  and trades extensively with the rest of the world,  the findings  out~ined 
above  would  not  necessarily  hold  true  if  the  Community  were  to  apply  a 
different principle of taxation from that used by  non-Member  States. 
3.  The  origin principle in a  framework of several countries 
These  issues were  raised  some  time  ago  but first analysed  in greater detail by 
Shibata31 •  Shibata  analysed the allocation where  the  Community  went  over to 
the  origin  principle  while  the  rest  of  the  world  retained  the  destination 
principle.  Shibata  refers  to  such  a  system  as  the  restricted  origin 
principle.  Since  the  destination  principle  is  dominant  in  world  trade  and 
will  probably  remain  so  in  the  immediate  future,  this is a  logical extension 
of  the analysis32. 
3 ° Cf.  WHALLEY  ( 1979),  "Uniform  domestic  tax  rates,  trade  distortions  and 
economic  integration",  Journal  of  Public  Economics  11,  p.  215.  See  also 
the author's proofs  in Annex  3. 
31  The  problem  was  first  raised in the  Neumark  Report.  Cf.  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY,  COMMISSION  (1962),  p.  82  et seq.  A detailed analysis  can  be 
found  in  SHIBATA,  The  theory  of  economic  unions,  in  SHOUP  (ed)(1967), 
Fiscal  harmonization  in  common  markets,  Vol  1,  New  York,  pp.  145-264,  in 
particular pp.  206  et seq. 
32  The  following results are taken  from  Berglas  and  Whalley,  who  use  a  general 
equilibrium  model.  Cf.  WHALLEY  (1979),  pp.  218  et  seq  and  BERGLAS  (1981), 
pp.  381  et seq.  These also contain a  formal  analysis. - 24  -
Now,  in addition to  high tax  country  B  and  low  tax country A  forming  a  single 
market  without  fiscal frontiers as above,  we  have the rest of the world in the 
form  of  country  w.  In  view  of  its dominant  size  W determines  the  level  of 
world  commodity prices.  A and  B apply the destination principle in trade with 
w,  i.e.  exports  free  of  tax  with  a  refund  of  input  tax  and  a  compensatory 
import  tax  at  the  domestic  rate.  Between  themselves,  however,  A and  B  apply 
the origin principle. 
In  comparison  with  the  straightforward  destination  principle  or  origin 
principle,  the  high-tax  country  now  has  a  loss  of  revenue  which  cannot  be 
offset by  an  adjustment  process since relative prices remain unchanged. 
The  reason  for  this  is that  in  the  common  market  under  the  origin principle 
consumer prices are the  same.  Therefore consumer prices in high-tax country B 
fall  to the  level  of  country  A33 •  In trade with A producer prices in 8  would 
have  to fall  by  the tax  factor  (l+tA)/(l+t8 )  and  would  thus be below the pre-
tax  level.  However,  this would  not  happen  since in trade with W B's producers 
would  still be  able  to obtain the old producer price  owing to the border  tax 
adjustment  and the prevailing world prices. 
B's  total  production  would  therefore  be  sold to w.  The  tax authorities in  8 
would  lose  tax  revenue  from  domestic  production  since  they  are  obliged  to 
refund  input  tax  at  the  border.  They  would  not  recover  this  amount  since 
domestic  consumption  would  have  to be  covered  by  imports  from  A34,  with which 
it is assumed that the origin principle applies.  Consequently,  there would be 
no  compensatory  import  tax.  This  would  result  in  an  initial loss of  revenue 
for  country  B,  reflected in an equivalent gain in low-tax country A.  OWing 
3 3  There  will  be  a  similar  result  if  the  difference  in  tax  rates  were 
initially offset  by  a  devaluation  in  the  high-tax  country.  See  FRATIANNI 
and  CHRISTIE  ( 1981)  "Abolishing  fiscal  frontiers  within  the  EEC",  Public 
Finance  36,  pp.  411-429,  here  p.  422.  A  detailed  discussion  of  the 
authors'  views  can be  found  in section C.I.2. 
34  It is conceivable that these might  be  supplied by W but owing to the higher 
compensatory  import  tax  in  8  such  products  would  be  more  expensive  than 
those  supplied through A. - 25  -
to its fixed  production capacity,  A can only cover 8's additional consumption 
with  the  help  of  imports  from  world  market  W whose  supply  is elastic.  This 
generates additional compensatory  import tax revenue  for A. 
A  further  reallocation  of  tax  revenue  favourable  to  A  and  unfavourable to  8 
results  from  the  following  distortion1  producera  in  A  will  not  export  to  " 
directly but  indirectly via  8  since this will give  them  a  higher refund which 
will  have  to  be  met  by  B's  tax  authorities  without  them  having  levied  any 
input tax35 • 
In this case there  is  no  pressure  on  the exchange  rate.  Producer prices in A 
and  B  are  the  same  and  correspond to the world  price level.  consumer  prices 
in  the  two  countries  are  also  the  same.  Since  the  net  trade  positions  of  A 
and  B  remain  unchanged  additional  imports  being  offset  by  additional 
exports of equivalent value  - the exchange rate remains constant36• 
In  this  analysis  of  the  various  proposals  there  is  one  more  important 
assumption  that  must  be  relaxed:  so  far  a  single  stage  production  tax  has 
been  assumed.  However,  the  basis  for  discussion  must  be  a  value-added  tax 
which  is  a  multistage  tax.  This  is essential even  if it may  well  complicate 
the  analysis.  Unless  otherwise  indicated,  the  framework  is one  in which  tax 
is shifted forward. 
35  A  possible  solution would  be  the  introduction of  a  common  external tax for 
imports  and  exports  but  here  too  distortions  are  likely  to  arise.  See 
WHALLEY  (1979),  p.  219. 
36  A detailed discussion of the restricted origin principle in the case of the 
same  tax  rates  in  A  and  B  but  disequilibrium  in bilateral trade  balances 
with  W  can  be  found  in  Whalley  and  Berg  las.  Here  there  may  also  be 
distortions  in  the  form  of  income  effects.  cf.  Journal  of  Public 
Economics:  WHALLEY  (1979),  pp.  218  et  seq.;  BERGLAS  (1981),  pp.  382  et 
seq.  and  WHALLEY  (1981),  'Border  adjustments  and  tax  harmonization: 
Comment  on Berglas',  Journal of Public Economics  16,  pp.  389-390 - 26  -
C.  PROPOSALS  FOR  TAX  HARMONIZATION  WITH  THE  RIMOVAL  OF  FISCAL  FRONTIB8S 
I.  Proposals baled on  an  exchapqe rate a41ult!'nt 
1.  Origin principle with deduction of  input value in transfrontier trade 
In  an  opinion  on  the  commis•ion'a  White  Paper  on  the  internal  market,  the 
Economic  Advisory  Council  to  the  Federal  German  Ministry  for  Economics 
expressed  its  views  on  fiscal  harmonization37 •  Under  the  heading  'less need 
for  harmonization  with  the  origin  principle'  it  advocates  a  switch  to  the 
origin  principle  in  transfrontier  trade  both  within  the  Community  and  with 
third countries. 
As  show  in  section  B.II.l.b.  under  the  origin  principle  differences  in  the 
level of taxation are generally offset by the exchange rate,  provided that two 
conditions  are  fulfilled.  Firstly  - as  the  Advisory  Council  rightly points 
out  - there  must  be  only  one  tax  rata  in each country;  secondly - abandoning 
the  assumption  of direct  supplies to the consumer  in  importing countries - it 
must  be  ensured  that  in  the  caae  of  a  value-added  tax  there  is  no  double 
taxation  in the  importing country. 
The  Economic  Advisory Council  therefore proposes that provision should be made 
for  a  tax-base-on-tax-base  deduction  (corresponding  to  the  gross  value  of 
imports)  in  transfrontier  transactions  whereas  for  domestic  transactions  the 
tax-amount-on-tax-amount  deduction should continue to apply. 
In  view  of  the  obvious  diversity in the  number  and  level  of tax  rates  in the 
Community  it  is  unlikely  that  these  conditions  - specifically  a  single  tax 
rate  in  each  country  - can  be  fulfilled  in  the  near  future.  The  same  holds 
true of  implementation of the proposal  (origin principle with tax-base-on-tax-
base  deduction)  in  trade  with  third  countries.  For  this  reason  alone it is 
somewhat  surprising  that  such  a  proposal  should  have  made  by  the  German 
31  cf.  DER  WISSENSCHAFTLICHE  BEIRAT  BEIM  BUNDESMINISTERIUM  FOR  WIRSTSCHAFT 
(1986),  stellungnahme  zum  Weisabuch dar EG-Kommisaion  tiber  den  Binnenmarkt, 
Gutachten  vom  21/22  Februar  1986,  (opinion  on  the  EC  Commission's  White 
Paper  on  the  internal  market),  Bonn,  Section  IV  Tax  harmonization 
(paragraphs  13-16),  particularly pp.  20-24 - 27  -
Economic  Advisory  Council  which  itself  admits  that  'it would  not  be  easy  to 
create the conditions for  such  a  reform' 38• 
In  addition  to  this  obvious  objection  it  ia  worth  looking  more  elosely  at 
further  stages  of  processing  in  the  importing  country.  How  can  double 
taxation of  imports  be  avoided at subsequent  stages in the importing country? 
There  is  no  double  taxation  for  the  importer  since  he  can make  a  tax-base-on-
tax-base  deduction.  Even  though  the  importer  will  only  shift  forward  the 
amount  of  tax  corresponding  to  the  value  he  has  added,  at  the  subsequent 
stages  the  deduction  of  input  tax  will  inevitably  lead  to  double  taxation 
since the subsequent producers will not  be able to deduct previous turnover. 
Surprisingly  the  German  Economic  Advisory  Council  disregards  this  problem 
totally in its opinion.  A  possible means  of preventing double taxation would 
be  to  pass  on  separately  the  input tax  and  previous  turnover to the value  of 
the  imports39 •  This  would  avoid  double  taxation  since  every  producer  in 
calculating  his  liability  would  be  entitled  to  deduct  both  the  previous  tax 
and  the gross value of the  imports.  The  exchange rate would then even out tax 
inclusive prices. 
This  proposal  would  be  neutral  in terms  of  allocation.  However,  considerable 
complications  arise  when  one  abandons  the  unrealistic  and  fictitious 
assumption  that  there  is  always  one  type  of  end  product.  As  a  rule  many 
products  are  semi-finished  and  are  combined  in  a  variety of  ways  with  other 
semi-finished products  in the production process.  How  is it then possible to 
distribute  the  foreign  previous  turnover  to  individual  (semi-finished) 
38  DER  WISSENSCHAFTLICHE  BEIRAT  BEIM  BUNOESMINISTERIUM  FOR  WIRTSCHAFT  (1986), 
p.20.  Translation of the quotation was  made  by the author. 
39  Andel  proposes  instead  of  this  a  fictitious  deduction  of  input  tax.  In 
this case  a  further  problem arises  since this is only  possible for persons 
entitled  to  deduct  input  tax  and  not  for  consumers.  cf.  ANDEL 
( 1986), Sollte  man  in  der  EG  im  Rahmen  der  Mehrwertsteuer  zum  Ursprungs 
1 andpr  inz ip  Ubergehen?  Bemerkungen  zu  einem  Vorschlag  des 
Wissenschaftlichen  Beirats  beim  Bundesministerium  fUr  Wirtschaft  (Should 
the  EC  change over to the origin principle for VAT?  Comments  on  a  proposal 
made  by  the  Economic  Advisory  Council  of  the  Federal  Ministry  for 
Economics;  Finanzarchiv,  Neue  Folge.  Vol.  44.  No  3,  pp.  484-488;  here 
pp.  486 et seq. - 28  -
prod~cts  and  pass  it on?  It is doubtful  whether  such  a  system could work  in 
practice.  Moreover  allowing  a  tax-base-on-tax-base  deduction  involves  a 
combination  of  deduction  arrangements,  which  is  undesirable  on  control 
grounds  &lone.  Consequently  this proposal  is unrealistic  particularly  since 
it requires  a  far-reaching degree of harmonization,  namely  a  single tax rate. 
It is also evident  from  this that if border tax  adjustments are abolished the 
exchange  rate  does  not  even  out  differences  in  tax  rates  to the extent  that 
there is no  double taxation at aubsequent  stages in the importing country. 
2.  An  exchange  rate  approach  with  multiple  tax  rates  and  a  degree  of 
harmonization 
Does  this  mean  that  the  origin  principle  is  a  textbook  solution  for  the 
abolition  of  fiscal  frontiers?  Or  is  there  an  approach  which  would  permit 
several  tax  rates,  prevent  double  taxation  in  the  importing  country  and  be 
neutral  in  its  effect  on  semi-finished  products?  The  last  two  conditions 
could  be  satisfied if,  instead  of  passing  on  previous turnover  and  input  tax 
or  a  fictitious  input  tax,  one  opted  for  a  combined  deduction  of  previous 
turnover/input  tax40 •  In  this  case  the  gross  import  turnover  consisting of 
the price  and  the  tax  component  would  be  broken  down  as if it were  a  domestic 
purchase  with  the  same  gross  price.  The  'new'  tax  component  corresponds  to 
the domestic tax rate multiplied by the corrected tax base  and is passed on as 
input tax  in the  importing country. 
In  an  article  in Public  Finance41  Michele  Fratianni  and  Herbert  Christie take 
this  mechanism  as  a  basis  for  their  proposal  for  a  modified  exchange  rate 
approach which  assumes  a  degree of  'pre-harmonization'. 
This  proposal is based on the  following  assumptions:  instead of waiting until 
international  negotiations  achieve  an  approximation or standardization of  tax 
40  cf.  BIEHL  (1969),  p.  165  et  seq.  There  is  a  difference between passing on 
previous  turnover  and  input  tax  separately  - as  discussed  earlier  - and 
this combined  deduction of previous turnover  and  input tax 
41  cf.  FRATIANNI  and  CHRISTIE  (1981),  pp.  419  and  428 - 29  -
structures,  and  in  particular  a  single  rate,  as  in  the  German  Economic 
Advisory  Council's  proposals,  it  is  assumed  that  fiscal  frontiers  will  be 
abolished by  a  given deadline  - i~ three to five years42 • 
According  to  Fratianni  and  Christie,  this  would  result  il\  ; aemi-automatic 
adjustments'  thereby  permitting  an  effective  exchange  rate  adjustment  even 
before the deadline,  despite the existence of several tax rates. 
This  would  come  about  because  trading  partners  realize that  the abolition of 
fiscal  frontiers  without  coordination  of  tax  rates  and  levels  would  lead to 
considerable  windfall  profits  for  some  sectors  or  industries  and  counterpart 
losses  in other countries.  Since each country has relative tax advantages  for 
certain  sectors,  negotiations  would  be  bound  to  lead  to  respective  national 
'approximation'  of tax  inclusive prices for each product. 
In  this  case  'approximation'  does  not  mean  an  international  equalization  of 
the  price  for  a  given  product  - differences  here being  offset by the exchange 
rate  but  that  relative  domestic  product  prices  would  be  the  same 
internationally. 
If perfect  competition  means  that the  net prices of  ~oods are identical there 
is  no  need  for  prior  harmonization  to  achieve  a  single  tax  rate  in  each 
country.  The  exchange  rate  will  offset  the  relative  difference  in  gross 
prices.  Where  there  are  several  tax  rates,  the  same  tax  rate ratio at  home 
and  abroad  will  not  result  in the  same  gross  price ratio.  Tax  rates must  be 
such  (pre-harmonization)  that relative gross  prices  coincide.  Thus  tax rates 
do  not  need to be  standardized but serve as  a  parameter of pre-harmonization. 
On  completion  of  this  phase  when  fiscal  frontiers  are  abolished the exchange 
rate will  even  out  the  relative gross  price difference  and  thus  the tax rate 
differences  they  include.  Fratianni  and  Christie  show  in  their  general 
equilibrium  model  involving  two  countries  that  in  the  single  maJ;"ket  prices 
will be  the  same  when  converted into one  specific currency43• 
42  cf.  ibid p.  414 
43  cf.  ibid pp.  417  et seq. - 30  -
Frat.i,anni  and  Chr·istie  also  discuss  the  situation  in  which  there  is  a  third 
country  which  is . not  a  member  of  the  common  market.  Their  findings  are 
basically  the  same  as  those  of  Shibata  and  Berglas44•  A  change  in the tax 
rate  in  one  Member  State can  be offset  by the  exchange rate between countries 
in the  common  market.  However this will automatically alter the exchange rate 
:·position  vis-A-vis  the  non-Member  State  simply  because  of  freedom  of 
arbitrage.  It  is  unlikely  that  the  resulting  fluctuations  in  prices  and 
exchange  rates between all the countries will remove all distortions. 
on  the  assumption  that  supply  ia  infinitely  price  elastic,  equivalent  gross 
prices  cannot  be  achieved  unless  there  is  balanced  trade  with  non-Member 
States45 • 
II.  The Deferred Payment  Scheme  IDPS) 
As  described  in  section  B,  under  the destination principle it is the tax rate 
of  the  importing country which  is applied and the total tax revenue accrues to 
the  country  in which  the  goods  are consumed.  However,  it was  also shown that 
the  destination  principle  in  its current  form  has  the  distinct  dis.advantage 
of  necessitating  a  border  tax  adjustment  which  is  time  consuming  and 
administratively cumbersome. 
It might  be  wondered  therefore  why  we  are  now  considering  a  proposal based on 
the destination principle.  The  reason  is this:  as  in the case of the origin 
principle,  the  results of  an  analysis  of  a  single-stage tax  cannot be applied 
on  a  general  basis  and  the  results are quite different  if one  takes  a  value-
added  tax.  The  same  holds  true here.  In  the case of  a  value-added tax with 
44  See  section B.II.3. 
45  cf.  FRATIANNI  and  CHRISTIE  (1981),  pp.  423  et seq. - 31  -
deduction  of  input  tax it is possible to shift the border tax .adjustment  from 
the border to elsewhere within the country46 • 
The  Deferred  Payment  Scheme  (DPS)  is  a  system  used  in  the  Netherlands, 
Belgium,  Luxembourg  and  by the United Kingdom  until 198447  under which exports 
are  still  zero-rated  and  input  tax  refund•d·  However,  collection  of  the 
compensatory  import  tax is shifted to the first taxable unit  in the importing 
country.  One  of the major  advantages  of. the DPS  is that it would .require only 
few  changes  in the existing system and would maintain present  reven~e sharing. 
The  DPS  operates  as  followsz  as  at present,  exports  are still zero-rated by 
the  exporting  country.  Proof  that  the  goods  have  actually  been  exported 
abroad,  the  basis  of  tax  exemption  and  refund  of  input tax,  must  be_  provided 
by  the  exporter  in  the  form  of  appropria~e  document~,  for  example  bills  of 
lading  or  evidence  of  payments  from  abroad.  Thus  proof  in  the  form  of 
physical controls at the border establishing that the goods  have been exported 
is replaced  by existing documents48 • 
Under  the  DPS  the  importing  country  levies the compensatory  import  tax not at 
the border  but  on  the first taxable unit  in the  imparting country.  As  a  rule 
this is the  importer  who,  when  calculating his  tax  liability,  can deduct  from 
the arithmetical tax payable only input tax paid on domestic  input purchases. 
To  give  an  illustration49 :  a  producer with  full  tax  liability who  has  a  net 
sales  turnover  of  OM  50  000  with  domestic  input  purchases  of  DM  30  000  and 
imports  of  OM  10  000  can,  at  a  tax  rate of  19%,  deduct  from  his  arithmetical 
liability  of  OM  9  500  (i.e.  50  000  *  0.19)  input  tax  of  only  DM  5  700  (i.e 
46  The  British Government  recently supported simplifying border formalities in 
this  way  as  a  first  step  towards  removing  fiscal  frontiers.  cf.  British 
Embassy  (Ed.)  (1988),  Taxation in the internal market.  A market-orientated 
concept,  European  notes  from the United Kingdom,  E  15/88,  Bonn. 
47  Thia  method  is  also  referred  to  as  the  Postponed  Accounting  System  (PAS), 
cf.  LEE  et al.  (1988),  p.  21. 
48  cf.  CNOSSEN  and  SHOUP  (1987),  p.  74 
49  Example  taken  from  cnossen,  cf.  ibid p.  75 - 32  -
30  000  *  0.19).  If the imports were  also domestic purchases his tax liability 
would  not  be  DM  3  800  as  above but only  OM  1  900. 
It is obvious that this scheme  involves only a  technical change  in processing. 
The  tax burden  and exchange rates remain the  same  as under the present system. 
However  the system merely reduces border controls in that documentary evidence 
is  required  to  establish  that  the  goods  have  actually  been  exported50•  To 
ensure  that  the  producer  deducts  input  tax  only  on  domestic  input  purchases, 
the  exporter/transporter  would  have  to  present  a  copy  of  the  invoice  at the 
border. 
III.  Proposals based on transfrontier deductions 
1.  The  Common  Market  Principle  CCMP) 
The  proposal  by  t~n  Ecop~mi~ Advi~~ry Council  for  th5 German  Federal Ministry 
for  Economics  is based on  a"mechanism allowing the  importer to deduct .previous 
turnover  in  international  trade.  Since, the  gross  value  of  imports  can  be 
deducted,  the  exchange  rate  mechanism  offsets  different  levels  of  taxation. 
However  the  difficulty  that  arose  was  how  to  avoid  double  taxation  at 
subsequent  stages  of  production  in  the  importing  country,  particularly where 
it applied  a  system of deduction of  input tax. 
However  would  it be  possible to  have  a  system  allowing deductions  to be  made 
across  borders,  i.e.  either  a  value-added  tax  with  deduction  of  previous 
turnover or  deduction  of  input  tax  on all stages of  production?  This must  be 
possible,  for  it  would  mean  the  exporting  country  taxing  the  value  of  the 
5° Cf.  c.  LEE  et  al.  (1988),  p.  21.  The  British  Government  also  fails  to 
discuss  how  further  simplification could  be  achieved,  cf.  British  Embassy 
(1988),  p.  9. - 33  -
exports  and  the  importing country the net domestic turnover without  any double 
taxation.  Biehl refers to this as the Common  Market  Principle  (CMP) 51 • 
In  such  a  case  what  would  be  the  final  taxation borne by the product?  In the 
case  of  goods  supplied  to  a  non-registered  trader  it  would  be  the  same  as 
under  the  origin  principle,  in  the  case  of  goods  supplied  to  a  registered 
trader  it  might  correspond,  depending  on  the  subtraction  met}?.od,  to  the 
destination  principle  or  to  a  combination  of  the  tax  rates  of .the· exporting 
and  importing countries52 • 
Where  the  deduction  of  previous  turnover  applies,  the  tax  burden  corresponds 
to the arithmetical mean  of the tax rates weighted  by the added value and thus 
does  not  coincide  with  the  nominal  tax  rate of  one  or  the  last  stage.  In  a 
common  market  without  internal  frontiers  this  can  lead  to different  consumer 
prices,  thereby  indirectly  benefiting  those  producers  whose  products  or  a 
large proportion of their components are produced  in a  low-tax country. 
This  potential  distortion  can  be  removed  by  deduction  of  input  tax since its 
compensatory  effect  gives  the  same  tax  burden  (in  a  given  country) 
irrespective  of  where  production  took  place.  ~  In  the  case  of  supplies  to  a 
registered  trader,  which  will  generally  be  the  case,  it then  corresponds  to 
the destination principle. 
The  difference  between  this  and  the  previous  destination  principle  with 
compensatory  effect  lies  in  the  abolition  of  the  border  tax  adjustment-
instead  tax  deduction  is  possible  across  borders  - and  in  a  change  in  the 
allocation  of  tax  revenue,  which  is  now  determined  by  tax  rates  and  added 
value53 • 
51  Cf.  BIEHL  (1986)  Die  Beseitigung dar  Steuergrenzen in der  EG.  Die  neue 
Strategie  der  EG-Kommission,  (The  removal  of  fiscal  frontiers  in  the 
Community.  The  new  Commission  strategy),  Wirtschaftsdienst 10/86,  pp.  518-
524;  here  p.  521. 
52  Cf.  PEFFEKOVEN  ( 1983),  p.  224.  As  Peffekoven  rightly  points  out  the 
usual  classification  of  destination  principle  and  origin  principle  is  no 
longer valid here. 
53  Cf.  BIEHL  ( 1982),  Towards  a  general  theory  of  taxing  international 
transactions  - a  taxonomy  of  international  taxation  principles,  Public 
Finance  37,  p.  196.  Biehl  refers to these  two  factors only in writing. 
Mathematical  calculations of the parameters can be  found  in Annex  4(a). - 34  -
The  CMP  with  deduction  of  input  tax  can  be  illustrated  by  an  example54:  a 
Danish  exporter  sells  goods  to  the  United  Kingdom  at  a  net  price  of  3055 
including  22%  VAT  i.e.  36.60.  The  British importer  adds  value of  70 to give a 
total  value  of  100.  UK  VAT  of  15\  would  be  payable  on  this  amount  i.e.  15, 
with  the  import  tax  of  6.60  already  paid  in  Denmark  being  deductible.  Hence 
15  minus  6. 60  equals  8. 40.  The  tax  is  thus  exactly  the  same  as  under  the 
destination  principle,  the  status  quo  is maintained- all  goods'(unless  they 
are direct  imports)  in one country are taxed at the  same rate. 
Let  us  now  see  whether  the  CMP  with  deduction  of  input  tax  in  the  case  of 
supplies  to  a  registered  importer  is  identical  to  the  destination  principle 
apart  from  the allocation of tax revenue.  At  first sight this would  appear to 
be  the case.  However,  a  changeover  from  the present destination principle to 
the  CMP  would  not  be  neutral  in  its  effects  on  the  trade  balance  where  tax 
rates  are different.  Since  deduction  of  input  tax means  that producers still 
go  by  producer  prices,  to  ensure  that  producer  prices  are  the  same  as  under 
the  destination principle  in the  common  market  exchange  rates must  not alter. 
However  this  inevitably  causes  disequilibrium  in  the  trade  balance  which  is 
made  up of gross prices56 • 
2.  The  Clearing-House 
A  proposal  based  on  the  CMP  with  deduction  of  input  tax is the clearing-house 
system  proposed  ~6y  the  European  Commission  for  the  first  time  in  its  1985 
54  Example  based  loosely on  LEE  et al.  (1988)  p.  18 
~> 5  As  under  the  destination  principle  with  tax  shifted  forward  the 
exchange  rate  plays  no  role  in  this  simple  example  since  the  producer 
takes  the  net  price  only  into  account.  To  simplify  matters  one  currency 
unit  is used  rather than  several currencies. 
56  Cf.  Annex  5 (a) .  This  simple  modtfl  merely  proves  that  there  is  no 
exchange  rate  that  can  even  out  both  the  trade  balance  and  the  producer 
prices.  This  implies that changeover  from the destination principle to the 
CMP  must  be  offset  by  a  change  in  volume.  Hence  the  CMP  could  not  be 
regarded  as  neutral.  This  shows  only  the  existence  of  an  adjustment 
process  but  nothing  about  how  it  operates  and  its  stability.  This 
shortcoming  becomes  obvious  if  it  is  no  longer  assumed  that·  production 
factors  are  immobile.  See  section D.I.I. - 35  -
White  Paper  on  completing  the  internal  market57 •  An  analysis  of this system 
was  already  made  in  1981  by  A.  L.  c.  Simons  in an article in Intertax58•  The 
system  differs  from  CMP  with  deduction  of  input  tax  in  its  effects  on  tax 
revenue  sharing  and  its effects  on  the  trade  balance  but  not  aa  ~agards the 
tax burden.  Revenue continue• to accrue to the country in which the goode  ~re 
consumed59 • 
The  importing  country  therefore  claims  back  the  input  tax  paid  to  the 
authorities  in  the  exporting  country.  Since  each  country  will  receive 
payments  and  have  to  make  payments  to  the  other  Melilber  States·,  a  clearil).g 
system would operate at regular intervals. 
To  take the example  used  in the previous section,  the UK  tax authorities would 
'  reclaim  from  Denmark  the  6.60  input  tax paid  by the  importer.  The Danish tax 
authorities  received  this  6.60  from  the  exporter  which  means  that  the 
transaction would  not result in any  revenue or loss,  the effect being the same 
as  under  the  present  system.  This  net  transfer  from  the  high  tax country to 
the  low  tax  country  would  also  be  neutral  in  its effects  on  the  balance  of 
payments.  The  exchange rate remains  the  same60 • 
There  are  a  number  of  different  ways  in  which  claims,  such  as  that  in  our 
example of  a  single transaction,  could be dealt with. 
Firstly  it  could  be  done  bilaterally  on  a  micro-economic  basis,  i.e. 
transaction  by  transaction.  Or  the  redistribution could  be  done  on  a  macro-
57  Cf.  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  ( 1985),  p.  41  et  seq. 
(1987a),  and  (1987b),  Completion  of  the  internal  market: 
introduction  of  a  clearing-house  system  for  VAT  in  intra-Community  trade. 
Commission  working  document,  COM(87)  323  final,  Brussels,  4.8.1987. 
5° Cf.  SIMONS  ( 1981),  Simplification  of  VAT  procedures  in  intra-Community 
trade,  Intertax  10,  pp.  375-382. 
~
9  Where  the  trade balance,  tax  burden  and  revenue  distribution correspond to 
the  destination  principle,  this  proposal  can  be  classified  under 
destination  principle  as  had  been  done  by  CNOSSEN,  cf.  CNOSSEN  and  SHOUP 
(1987),  p.  74.  However  it is  not  the classification that  is relevant  but 
the economic effects. 
6° Cf.  Annex  5(b) - 36  -
economic  basis,  e.g.  using  foreign  trade statistics61 •  In the  second case it 
is not  clear  how  it will  be  possible to make  exact calculations when  internal 
frontiers  have  been  abolished  and  there  is only vague  data,  if any,  on  trade 
patterns. 
The  Commission  therefore proposes  a  modified  micro-economic  approach  not  on  a. 
bilateral basis62 •  Instead,  each Member  State will calculate the tax payments 
on  exports  to  the  Member  States  and  the  input  t&X  deducted  on  imports  by 
domestic  producers  and calculate its net position vis  l  vis the Community as  a 
whole.  on  the basis of  this each  national  exchequer will pay in or receive  a 
balance. 
A  system  of  this  kind  clearly  requires  detailed  documentation  from  industry 
showing  the  country  from  which  products  have  been  purchased  and  the  tax 
included  in the price and  hence the amount  of tax deductible as  input tax63• 
In  order  to  prevent  tax  fraud  and  cross-border  shopping,  the  Commission 
rate.  The  first  would  be  between  14\  and  20%,  the  second  between  4\  and  9\ 
since  the  standard  rate  in  10  out  of  12  of  the Member  States would  currently 
fall  within  this  band64 •  The  broader  implications  of  these  proposals will be 
discussed  in greater detail  in section D.I.  below. 
61  Cf.  PARSCHE  et  al.  ( 1988),  Die  Beseitigung  von  Steuergrenzen  in  der 
Europaischen  Gemeinschaft,  Vorteile  und  Problema  einer  Harmonisierung  von 
Mehrwertsteuer  and  Verbrauchssteuern  im  europaischen  Binnenmarkt,  (The 
removal  of  fiscal  frontiers  in  the  European  Community.  Advantages  and 
problems  of  harmonizing  VAT  in  the  European  internal  market),  DIW 
Sonderheft  145,  Berlin,  pp.  436 et seq. 
62  Cf.  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  (1987a),  p.  7 
63  Cf.  ibid  p.  10.  German  industry  has  objected  to  the  additional 
administrative  work  that this  would  involve.  See  contribution by  Dr.  otto 
Wolff  von  Amerongen  in  the  minutes  of  the  public  symposium  on  tax 
harmonization  in  the  Community  held  by  the  German  Bundestag  (1988)  on 
3  February  1988,  in German  Protokoll  No.  14,  Az.  2450,  Bonn,  p.  44 
64  Cf.  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  (1987a),  p.  12 - 37  -
D.  TAX  HARMON! ZATION  AND  THE  ABOLITION  OF  FISCAL  F~ONTIERS  - A  COMPARATIVE, 
EXTENDED  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  EFFECTS  OF  VABIOUS  PROPOSALS 
I.  Possible distortions of the economies 
Building on  ~ection B,  the theory of taxation of international trade,  the last 
I 
section  analysed  the direct effects of  the taxation of  goods  at a  single rate 
or  modified  multiple  rates.  These  direct  effects  were  the  effects  on  the 
prices  of  goods,  trade  volumes,  the  exchange  rate  and  the  resulting  trade 
balance;  the  reduced  or  luxury  rates  in their  present  form  were  disregarded 
and  the analysis was  based on  a  single rate or on modified multiple rates. 
These  restrictions  have  been  relaxed  here  although  this  makes  the  analysis 
much  more  complex.  An  adequate  assessment  would  require  a  comprehensive 
micro-economic  model  that  could take  account of  international factor mobility 
and  the  incidence  of  multiple tax  rates  i~ an  open  economy.  At  present there 
is  no  such  model.  Despite  this  it  ilt  possible  to  arrive  at  a  number  of 
conclusions which are set out  ln  thi~ section. 
1.  Taxation  and overall  factor mobility 
At  first  sight it might  appear  surprising that  a  tax  on goods  should have  any 
indirect  effects.  What  · is  meant  here?  Does  a  general  sales  tax  affect 
anything  other  than  the  prices  of  goods,  the  volume  and  trade?  Or,  in other 
words,  are there effects on other markets  (factor markets)? 
First  of  all  it  is  helpful  to  draw  a  distinction  between  domestic  and 
international  effects.  In  analysing  the  first,  it  has  already  been  pointed 
out  that  distortion  of  consumer  decisions  is  possible  in  two  ways:  65  in 
comparison  to  a  no  tax  situation,  a  shift  in  consumption  from  goods  taxed at 
the  luxury  and  standard  rates  to  products  at  the reduced  rate is conceivable 
since  their  relative  price  has  fallen.  It  can  also  influence  the  choice 
between  working  and  leisure.  Such  distortions  can  be  ruled  out  on  the 
assumption that the government  redistributes the revenue  lump  sum.  · 
65  Cf.MUSGRAVE  et al  (1985),  pp.  104 et seq. - 38  -
Hence  it must  be  assumed  that  there will  be  effect~ on  decisions  and  factors 
not  specifically  related  to  goods  in  the  international  context.  This  has 
particular significance against the background of an  internal market with full 
mobility for all economic  operators and  factors. 
Where  tax  is  shifted  forward  there  is  an  incentive  for  migration  of·  the. 
production factors  labour  and capital66 •  Under the destination principle - in 
this  section  the  DPS  and  Clearing  House  ~chama  should  be  regarded  as 
equivalent  - there is  no  international  equalization of  consumer  prices.  'The 
application  of  export  rebates  and  import  taxes  acts  as  a  devaluation  and 
therefore  leads  to  a  revaluation  of  the  currency  of  the  country  with  the 
higher  tax  rates'  67 •  The  fact  that  there  is  an  exchange  rate  for  goods 
different  from  that  for  factors  will  trigger  labour  and  capital migration to 
the  low  tax  country  where  wages  and  capital  income  may  be  the  same  but  have 
greater  purchasing  power  owing  to  lower  prices.  This  situation  remains  the 
same  when  factors  cross  borders:  the  labour  factor  is  not  taxed  and  capital 
can  be transferred at a  constant exchange rate  69 
This  is not the  same  under the origin principle where it is worthwhile  for the 
labour  factor  to  move  from  the  high  tax  country  to  the  low  tax  country. 
Although  in  the  latter  the  nominal  income  earned  is  the  same  and  consumer 
prices  in  both  countries  are  identical,  it is worth  retransferring  income  to 
the  high  tax  country  where  purchasing  power  is  greater  owing  to  the 
devaluation of the high tax country's currency69 • 
66  Cf.  BIEHL  (1969)  pp.  339-369.  Here  too there is  no  closed specific micro-
economic  model  but considerations of principle. 
67  BIEHL  (1986),  p.521,  translation was  made  by the author. 
68  See  BIEHL  (1969),  pp.  340-348.  If  under  the  CMP  with  deduction  of  input 
tax  balanced  trade  is  achieved  by  a  change  in  the  volumes  traded,  where 
there  is  international  factor  mobility  the  qualitative effects of  the  CMP 
tend to be the  same  as under the destination principle. 
69  Cf.  ibid  p.  343.  The  exchange  rate  approach  of  Fratianni/Christie  would 
give  the  same  result  as  the  origin principle.  However,  since  some  degree 
of  harmonization  must  be  assumed  in  the  approximation  of  tax  rates,  the 
quantitative effects will probably not  be' identical. - 39  -
Under  the  origin principle  there  is  no  incentive  for  capital migration where 
tax is shifted forward.  The  transfer and retransfer of capital are sublect to 
exchange  rate  fluctuations  which  m~ans that purchasing power  remains  the  same 
despite different tax rates70• 
The  conclusions  to  be  drawn  h~re are  as  follows:  owing to the lesser _degree 
of distortion,  there is a  slight advantage  in proposals  based  on the exchange 
rate  argument.  This  is  because  where  tax  is  shifted  forward  there  is  no 
incentive for capital migration.  This is also more  significant in the case of 
the  Community  internal  market  since  in  the  more  immediate  future  there  is 
likely  to  be  less  labour  mobility,  on  the  grounds  of  language  alone,  than 
capital mobility. 
However,  the  limitations  of  this  model  are  clear:  it looks  at  the  incentive 
for  factor  migration  on  the  basis  of  a  model  concerned with the real side of 
the economy.  It remains to be  seen what  repercussions actual factor migration 
will  have  on  markets  for  goods,  particularly  if capital  transactions  have  a 
direct or indirect effect on  exchange rates. 
2.  The  problem of cross-border shopping,  zero rating and  luxury rates 
The  last  section discussed distortions  in the case of  non-goods  transactions. 
However,  there may  be distortions regarding the trade of goods attributable to 
tax structures and  tax rates,  for example the problem of cross-border shopping 
in  frontier  areas  which  has  frequently  given  rise  to  a  call  for  the 
equalization  of  tax  rates.  This  means  purchases  by  consumers  from  high  tax 
countries  in  low  tax countries to avoid high tax rates at home.  The  fact that 
this  problem  has  not  been  touched  upon  before  is indicative of  the fact  that 
7 ° Cf.  ibid  p.  345.  Where  tax  is  shifted  backwards  under  the  destination 
principle  and  the  origin  principle,  factor  mobility  leads  to distortions. 
Given  the  same  consumer  prices,  different  tax  rates  lead  to  different 
factor  remuneration.  There  is  an  incentive  to work  in  a  low  tax  country 
and  spend  earned  income  there.  .-.In  the  case  of  capital,  exchange  rate 
conditions  mean  that  a  transfer  of  capital  to  a  low  tax country is either 
neutral  (origin  principle)  or  advantageous  (destination  principle),  and 
owing  to  different  factor  remuneration  worthwhile  in  any  case.  Cf.  ibid 
pp.  370-378. it  is  a  derived  issue,  which  differs  according  ':.:.>  the  taxation  principle 
adopted. 
This  is  particularly  clear  where  the  origin  principle  is  appliltd  ...  in  this 
case  consumer  prices  converted  into  a  single  currency  are  evened  out  by  the 
exchange  rate  mechanism  thereby  dealing  with  the  problem  of  cross  border 
shopping  provided  there  is  a  single  VAT  rate or if a  degree  of  harmonization 
has  been  achieved,  as  in the Fratianni and Christie proposal. 
The  situation is rather different in the case of the other proposals since the 
final  consumer  is  not  entitled to  deduct  input  tax;  for  such  consumers  there 
is an  incentive to shop directly in the  low tax country71 •  The only situation 
in  which  there  is  no  such  incentive  is  where  the  tax  rates  are  fully 
harmonized  but  if the  economic  and  political price of this is regarded as too 
high the question that must  be posed is whether it is necessary to have  a  band 
within  which  tax  rates  ca~ vary  so  as  at  least to reduce direct cross  border 
shopping?  And  if so what  band  should be  introduced72 • 
The  example  of  the  USA  is  repeatedly cited  in  this  connection73 •  In  the  us 
there  is  trade  between  the  federal  states  without  any  border  tax  adjustment 
despite the  imposition  of  sales taxes  at different  rates.  The  differences in 
tax rates are generally up to  5  percentage points and the Commission therefore 
( 
regards  a  band  of  6  percentage  points  for  the  standard  rate  as  appropriate. 
71  such  fears  are  expressed  by  the  European  Commission  and  by  the  German 
Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry.  Cf.  the  GERMAN  BUNDESTAG  (1988),  pp.  40 
et seq  . 
.  , 2  This  pragmatic  approach  is  advocated  by  BIEHL  in  particular.  Cf.  BIEHL 
(1986)  p.  522  et  seq.  and  can best  be  described  as the maximum  and optimal 
harmonization.  The  British  Government  adopts  a  different  approach, 
believing  in  its  •market  orientated  concept'  that  the  simplification  of 
border  formalities  and  pressure  of  competition  will  result  in 
harmonization  of  tax  rates  at  a  relatively  low  level.  Since  the  only 
simplification  it  proposes  is  the  DPS,  and  the  example  of  the  BENELUX 
states  it quotes  have  not  given  rise to  any  pressure  for  adjustments,  the 
effectiveness of  the whole  proposal  is doubtful.  Cf.  British Embassy  (Ed) 
(1988)  p.9. 
73  Cf.  Commission  of the European  Communities  (1985),  p.44. - 41  -
Any  comparison  between the  USA  and  the Community74  naturally has  limitations. 
Firstly  in  the  USA  the  retail  sales  tax  accounts  for  a  smaller proportion of 
consumer  prices  owing  to  the  low  tax  rates.  Secondly,  specific  non-fiscal 
factors  are also significant:  in the USA  there are no  differences in languages 
or  currencies  which  suggests  that  competition  is  greater  than  in  the 
community.  On  the other hand,  the greater distances  mean  that .differences in 
tax rates are less of an  incentive for inter-state shopping75• 
Despite  these  differences  a  number  of  conclusions  can  be  drawn  from  the  US 
example,  namely  the  need  for  and  possibility of  a  pragmatic  solution.  What 
does  this  mean  in  terms  of  completion of the internal  market?  We  should  now 
look at the  reasons  given  by  the European  Commission  for  the tax rate band it 
has  proposed.  The  first  is that  the national  revenue  authorities  in a  high-
tax  country  would  lose  revenue,  the  second  that  producers  in  the  high-tax 
country  in  frontier  areas  would  be  at  a  competitive  disadvantage  owing  to 
~ 
cross-border shopping. 
The  solution  to  the  que.otlon  of  a  tax  rate  band  therefore  comes  down  to  a 
cost-benefit  analysis,  the  costs  being  a  loas  of  national  fiscal  autonomy 
whereas  the benefits are minimising shifts in trade patterns.  Restricting the 
standard  rate  to  within  6  percentage  points  may  well  be  too.  high  a  price to 
pay  since  ~he problem of cross-border shopping arises at only a  few  borders in 
Europe,  e.g.  the  German/Danish,  Belgian/Luxembourg  and  Ireland/Northern 
Ireland  borders  76 •  In  these  cases  the  VAT  rates  of  Greece  and  Portugal  are 
irrelevant. 
Moreover,  in a  high tax country the national  revenue authorities and producers 
in  border  areas  are  always  at  a  disadvantage.  It is thus  up  to  the  country 
concerned  to  decide  whether  it will  forego  this  revenue,  which  is generally 
insignificant  in  relation  to  other  VAT  revenue,  and  possibly  compensate 
74  Cf.  KUHN  and  WHITE  (1986),  'Examination  of  differences 
state/local  taxation  as  they  relate to  interstate commerce'. 
pp.110-120. 
75  cf.  ibid p.110 et seq. 
76  Cf.  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  (1985),  p.42. 
in  us  and 
Intertax  5, - 42  -
producers  in  frontier  areas77 •  Such  matters  could  9onceivably  be dealt with 
bilaterally between the states involved. 
The  problems  of  zero-rating  and  luxury  rates could  be dealt with in a  similar 
manner.  Zero-rating  is  defended  on  distributive  or  political  grounds, 
particularly in the United Kingdom.  Since the zero rate is applied to certain 
basic  necessities  for  which  there  is  little  incentive  for  personal 
importation  - there  is  no  compelling  reason  for  harmonization  78,  even  if it · 
would  be desirable for  such goods to be taxed at a  reduced rate for systematic 
reasons.  It is thus  possible to deal  with problems  of  income distribution if 
the  additional  tax  revenue  is  given  back  by  a  means  of  corresponding 
adjustments  in  income tax79• 
Luxury  tax rates pose  a  much  greater problem since they affect goods which are 
traded  to  a  greater  extent  (cars)  and  there  is  an  incentive  for  personal 
importation.  Since  the  higher  rates  apply  to  a  relatively  small  and  diverse 
the  standard rate.  This  holds true for  any of the proposals. 
77  This  is  the  view  taken  by  LEE  et al  (1988)  p.13.  This  appears  to pose  a 
major  problem  in the  case of  excise duties  on  tobacco  and alcohol.  In the 
case of  cons~mer goods  of a  high value there is generally a  notification or 
authorization requirement  (for example  for cars and yachts)  so that tax can 
be  levied at the domestic rate. 
78  The  IFS  study points out that  'The English Channel,  and more  subtle matters 
of  culinary  preference,  are  presumably  the  main  reasons  why  the  French 
would  not  flock  to  the  UK  to buy  zero  rated  food,  and  the  imposition of  4 
per  cent  VAT  on  food  in  the  UK  would  be  unlikely  to  have  much  effect  on 
this,  one  way  or the other.•  from  LEE  et al  (1988)  p.35. 
79  Cf.  ibid  p.S2.  for  a  detailed  analysis  of  the distributional effects of  a 
change  in tax structure and  the effects of  an  approximation of tax rates in 
the United  Kingdom. 
Bo  The  European  Commission puts the average  share of the tax base at less than 
10%.  Cf.  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  (1987a),  p.10 et seq. - 43  -
3.  Internal market  and tax evasion 
When  a  tax rate band is discussed,  it is often argued that it would ·reduce tax 
evasion.  Are  wide  differences  in th• standard tax rates  an  incentive for tax 
evasion? 
In  the  case  of  proposals  basad  on  exchange  rate adjustments  there is unlikely 
to be  any greater incentive for tax evasion than at present since the exchange 
rate  mechanism  means  that  the  gross  cost  of  input  purchases  from  abroad  is 
exactly the  same  as  those purchased domestically.  This  is not ·the case under 
the  deferred  payment  sch~me,  which  has  proved  successful  in  the  Netherlands 
but  would  greatly  increase  the  problems  of  enforcement  in  countries  like 
Italy81 • 
In  the case of the  CMP  with deduction of input tax or a  clearing-house.system, 
the  self-policing  element  in  the  deduction  of  input tax  may  well  prove to be 
insufficient.  Importers  in  high  t.l!x  countries  have  an  incentive  not  to 
declare input purchases  from  low tax countries.  This is  t~ their advantage if 
they  reduce  their turnover  by the  same  amount,  since the  input tax deductible 
in  respect  of  imports  at  a  lower  tax  rate is  less  than  the  additional  tax 
liability  that  would  result  from  the  correct  application  of  the  higher 
domestic tax rate to the correct total turnover. 
The  only way  of counteracting this trend is if instead of the present controls 
at  frontiers  there  is  a  kind  of  a  posteriori  control  through  closer 
cooperation  and  a  better  exchange  of  data  between  the  national  tax 
authorities.  This  is quite  feasible  i~ the Clearing-House  system  proposed by 
81  Cf.  CNOSSEN  and  SHOUP  (1987),  p.76;  PEDONE  (1981),  'Italy'  in:  Aaron  (ed), 
The  value-added  tax.  Lessons  from  Europe,  The  Brookings  Institution, 
Washington  D.C.,  pp.  31-42;  here p.35.  See also the interesting comment  by 
Wolff  von  Amerongen,  that  the  Italian  authorities  have  been  one  of  the 
largest  clients  of  IBM  computer  systems  in  recent  years  cf.  German 
Bundestag  (1988)  p.59 -:  44  -
the  Commission  since  the  clearing  of  claims  necessarily  implies  more 
centralized data82 • 
In  the  case  of  all  the  proposals  it  is  necessary  and  senaibl•  to  have  a 
uniform  tax  base  and  fewer  tax  rates  applied  to  the  same  goods.  An 
approximation of  the  standard rates can  be  justified to a  limited extent only 
between certain neighbouring states. 
I I.  Revenue  allocation  according  to  c!eatipation.  origin  or  29P"?D  prket 
principle? 
Before  discussing  an  'equitable'  sharing  of  the  revenue,  we  shall  consider 
the tax yield allocation under the CMP  in greater detail,  including the effect 
bn  trade balances. 
Whereas  under  the oriqin principle revenue  from  total domestic  production  and 
under  the  destination  principle  revenue  from  total  domestic  consumption, 
accrued  to  the  national  tax  authorities,  under  a  system  based  on  CMP  with 
deduction  of  input  tax,  the  ~!location of  revenue  is not  clearly determined. 
Insofar  as  goods  are  not  supplied. directly  to  consumers,  revenue  allocation 
depends  on  the tax rates ratio and the degree of  added value. 
It  may  happen  that  the  importing  country  systematically  loses  tax revenue  to 
the exporting country  (tax export)83 •  This arises specifically when the total 
value-added  resulting  from  a  cross-border  production  process  multiplied  by 
the  tax  rate  of  the  importing country is lower  than the  amount  of  tax  in the 
82  cf.  COMMISSION  OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  (1987b),  p.  8  et seq.  and  12  et 
seq.  on  the  other  hand,  the  French  Government  fears  that  Commission 
proposals will  create  a  greater  i~centive for  tax  evasion.  cf.  COMMISSION 
DE  REFLEXION  ECONOMIQUE  POUR  LA  PREPARATION  DE  L'ECHEANCE  DE  1992  (1988). 
Fiscalite  et  march~  unique  europ6en,  (Taxation  and  the  Single  European 
Market)  interim  report  to  the  Minister  of  State,  Ministry. of the  Economy, 
Finance  and  Privatization,  Paris,  p.lS et seq. 
83  A  definition  of  tax  export  can  be  found  in  PEFFEKOVEN  (1975)  zur  Theorie 
des  Steuerexports  (On  the  theory  of  tax  export),  Mohr,  TUbingen, 
particularly pp.  1-6 - 45  -
exporting  country  arrived  at  by  multiplying  the  export  value  by  the tax  rate 
there.  This  is  obviously  only  the  case  if  the  tax  rate  in  the  import.ing 
country is lower than  in the exporting country. 
If  this  is  applied  to the  two-country  model  it means  that,  assuming  balanced 
trade,  a  country  will  lose  revenue  compared  to  a  situation  in  which  the 
destination principle applies,  if its tax rate is  lowe~ than that of the other 
country84 • 
A greater or  lesser  loss or gain  in  revenue  occurs  where the trade balance is 
not  in  equilibrium.  If  the  country  with/·the  lower  tax  rate wants  to  obtain 
the  same  revenue  as  under  the  destination principle,  its exports must  exceed 
imports  by  a  factor  of  the  inverse  tax  rate  ratio,  i.e.  it must  be  a  net 
exporter85 • 
It  is  obvious  from  this that  the  implementation of  each  proposal will give  a 
different  allocation  of  revenue.  Whereas,  under  the  destina~ion principle, 
the  deferred  payttt'dnt.  achuhta,  t.he  clearing-~houae  scheme  and  the  origin 
principle,  the  impact  on  revenue  allocation is clear  - in principle the first 
<·' 
three  favour  countries  which  are  net  importers  whereas  the  origin  principle 
favours  net  exporters  - in  the  case  of  the  CMP,  the  deduction  of  input  tax 
across  borders  makes  any  projection  of  the  change  in  revenue  allocation 
compared to the status quo  more  complex. 
Estimates  produced  by  the  Commission  give  an  indication  of  how  revenue 
allocation  would  look  under  a  system  of  cross-border  deduction  of  input tax, 
but  without  clearing,  compared  to  the  present  situation86 •  However,  all 
calculations indicate that Ireland and  Denmark  would  suffer a  relatively large 
84  See calculations in Annex  4(b). 
0 ~  See  Annex  4(c) 
06  Indirectly  because  the  Commission's  working  document  gives  the  annual  net 
amount  that  would  result  under  the  clearing-house  scheme.  However,  these 
figures  are  not  based  on  its  suggested  bands  of  4%  to  9%  for  the  reduced 
rate  and  14-20%  for  the  standard  rate,  but  on  average  values of  16.5%  for 
the  standard  rate  and  6.  5%  for  the  reduced  rate.  cf.  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities  (1987b),  p.  14 - 46  -
loss of  revenue,  whereas  Luxembourg,  Spain and Portugal would gain87 •  Even if 
the  Clearing-House  scheme  were  implemented  with  a  tax· rate  band,  Ireland and 
Denmark would still lose revenue  owing to their high standard tax  ra~e. 
In  view  of  the  hard-fought  battles in the  Member  States of the Community over 
the budget,  any  change  in the status quo of revenue sharing would generally be 
unwelcome  even  if it is imperative  on  economic  grounds.  This  seems to be the 
reason  why  the  Commission  is  proposing  the  Clearing-House  scheme  which  would 
guarantee the  same  revenue  sharing as at present. 
This  view  also concurs  with the  almost  unanimous  stance  adopted  by economists 
that  VAT  revenue  should  accrue  to  the  country  in  which  the  goods  are 
consumed88 •  For  this  very  reason  proposals  based  on  the  exchange  rate 
argument  are  not  readily  accepted  because  the  national  tax  authorities  would 
receive  revenue  from  domestic  production,  but  not  from  domestic  consumption. 
Moreover,  the problems of  international transfers are rarely discussed. 
Does  this  mean  that  revenue  sharing  under  the  CMP  is  not  only  unfeasible 
politically  but  also  unjustifiable  on  economic  grounds?  CNOSSEN  raises  a 
point  which  has  been  overlooked  in  the  economic  arguments  set out  above:  "In 
the  real  world,  the  appropriate  system  would  seem  to  be  to  hold  a  middle 
course  between  the origin  and  the destination principles.  At  least, it seems 
a  bit extreme  for  one  country,  the country  of  importation,  to get all the tax 
revenue  from  a  traded  good;  surely  the  country  of  exportation did  give  some 
services to  th~ producer."89 
87  cf.  LEE  et.  al.  (1988),  p.  46.  A  detailed analysis  of  the effects of  the 
Commission  proposals  on  Ireland  can  be  found  in  FITZGERALD  (1986),  The 
economic  implications  of  tax  harmonisation,  in:  The  Ecopomic  and  Social 
Research  Institute,  The  Economic  Consequences  of  European  Union.  A 
symposium  on  some  policy  aspects,  Dublin.  pp.  21-33.  For  Germany  cf. 
PARSCHE  ET.  AL.  (1988)  p.  60 et seq. 
88  The  Commission  does  not  even  raise  the  question  of  revenue  sharing. 
cf.  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  ( 1985),  p.  50.  Even  authors 
such  as  Fratianni  and  Christie,  whose  proposal  would  alter  revenue 
allocation,  agree  with  a  destination-principle  allocation:  'Windfall 
increases  or  deductions  in  tax  revenues  could  be  offset  by  international 
transfers,  if that were desired'  from  FRATIANNI  and  CHRISTIE  (1981),  p.  418 
89  CNOSSEN  and  SHOUP  (1987),  p.  69 - 47  ..I 
The  decision to choose  a  specific  location for  production could  be determined 
by  public services  such as  infrastructure,  a  good  legal  system,  a  good climate 
for  exports,  etc.  and  for  this  reason  the  country  of  exportation  could  be 
justified in claiming a  share of the revenue. 
This  argument  is  based  on  a  benefit  approach  which  attempts  to  internalize 
external effects with a  view to subsequent efficient allocation by taking into 
account the expenditure side of the national budget. 
The  opposite  of  this  is  an  approach  basad  on  the  ability-to-pay  principle 
whereby  revenue  accrues  to  the  country  of  consumption  merely  because of this 
fact  9 0 •  Such  a  proposal  is  all  the  more  reasonable  if  a  tax  incidence 
concept  which disregards the expenditure side is applied. 
III. Tax  harmonization and discretionary taxation policies 
The  issues  of  allocation  and  revenue  sharing  are  at  the  forefront  of  the 
fiscal  harmonization  deb~te,  as  they  have  been  in this analysis.  A  further 
central  issue is the position of  fiscal  policy,  and tax policy in particular, 
as  an  instrument  of  economic  policy  and  stabilization,  as well  as in relation 
to  monetary  policy.  This  applies  particularly to  the  transitional period  in 
which  the  economic  policies  of  the  European  Member  States still differ  in  a 
number  of  areas.  Significant  here  is  the  attempt  to  coordinate  monetary 
policy  more  closely  by  creating the  EMS.  By  and  large this  appears  to  have 
been  successful.  91  The  constant  pressure to maintain  exchange  rate parities 
within  the  permitted  margins  as  far  as  possible  imposes  constraints on  money 
supply  and  interest rate policy. 
During  the present  period of  limited convergence of  economic  policies  and the 
parallel  pressure  for  a  coordinated  monetary  policy,  fiscal  policy  is taking 
on  a  proportionately greater role in correcting potential regional  imbalances. 
90  cf MUSGRAVE  et al  (1985)  pp.  10-35 
91  cf  TANZI  and  TER-MINASSIAN  (1987)  "The  European  Monetary  System  and  Fiscal 
Polices",  in  :  CNOSSEN  (Ed),  pp.  337-357 - 48  -
,, 
Since  a  fiscal  policy  managed  via  the  issue  of  boPds  is  mora  closely  linked 
with the  monetary  sphere  (via  interest rates),  a  variation in tax rates could 
be  a  useful  instrument. 
Since  the  nature  and  scope  of  VAT  would  seem  to  make  it a  8uitable means  of 
influencing  overall  demand  in the  economy,  the  harmonization  of  tax rates or 
bringing  them  within too  narrow  a  band  would  involve curtailing the political 
choices  open  to  the  Member  Statea,  particularly  those  which  are  now  at  the 
limits of or outside the propoaed tax rate band. 
Conversely,  fiscal  policy  has  repercussions  in  the  monetary  sphere.  If,  as 
under  the  origin  principle,  a  change  in  tax  rates  were  to  give  rise  to  a 
corresponding  change  in  exchange  rate  parities  and  were  implemented  in  the 
EMS,  the stability of the monetary sector would  be  further disrupted,  not only 
within Europe but  in relation to third countries. 
E.  TAX  HARMONIZATION?  WELFARE  CONSIDERATIONS  BASED  ON  THE  THEORY  OF  SECOND 
BEST 
In  both  the  theoretical  analysis  given  in section  B of this paper  and  in the 
current  debate  on  fiscal  harmonization,  conclusions  are drawn  on the basis of 
a  Pareto-optimal  equilibrium.  It  is  assumed  that it is possible to  achieve 
an  efficient  allocation  of  this  kind  despite  taxation  ("first-best").  From 
the  point  of  view  of  welfare  economics,  the  marginal  conditions  are  not 
fulfilled  unless  taxation  and  state  transfers  are  possible  in  lump  sum 
form. 92  This  is  certainly  not  the  case  with  the  present  VAT.  It  is  a 
second-best  situation. 
The  question which  immediately arises is this:  do the advantages of a  taxation 
principle or  mechanism  within  the  framework  of  our  ideal  model  also hold true 
in  a  second-best  situation?  This  question  has  been  investigated  in greater 
92  cf  ATKINSON  and  STIGLITZ  (1987).  Lectures  on  Public  Economics, 
International Edition,  McGraw-Hill  Book,  Singapore,  pp.  356 et seq. - 49  -
detail  in  the  theory  of  optimal  taxation  and  a  e~ries  of  other  scientific 
studies  but  has  virtually  never  been  applied  to  the  problem  of  VAT 
harmonization  in the Community. 
The  question  remains  whether  a  change  in  the  existing  system  is acceptable. 
How,  for· example,  would  the proposal  for  complete  harmonization of tax rates, 
the  simplest  on  grounds  of  efficiency,  be  assessed  in  terms  of  its welfare 
effects.  Michael  Keen  was  the  first  to  discuss  the  welfare  effects  of  tax 
harmonizat!on  in 1987.93  Using  a  two-country model  and assuming different tax 
rates,  Keen  shows  ~hat if both  sides move  towards  a  weighted average  a  Pareto 
improvement  is  possible.  Although  this  analysi~ is  highly  simplified,  Keen 
points out that in general  a  Pareto  improvement  cannot be achieved without the 
help of compensatory transfers between States and  between consumers. 
This  relatively  simple  question  demonstrates  how  difficult it is to estimate 
the  effects  and  advantages  of  a  change  in  ·the  taxation  principle. 
background must  be taken into account  when  drawing  any conclusions. 
OONCLUSIONS 
This 
This  detailed  discussion  of  various  aspects  of  taxation  of  intra-Community 
trade  highlights  the  core  of  the  problem  analysed:  many  distortions  which 
arise  in  one  particular  case  do  not  arise  ih  another  or  not  in  a  comparable 
way.  None  of  the  proposals  is  neutral,  which  means  that  the  choice  of 
principle  is  a  question  of  trade-offs.  The  main  conclusions to be  drawn  are 
set out  below. 
It would  appear  to  be  advisable to  reduce  the  number  of  VAT  rates to two  only 
in  all  Member  States,  it  being  assumed  that  there  is  a  uniform  tax  base. 
There  should  be  a  standard  rate  and  a  reduced  rate.  There  is  no  need  for 
several  luxury  rates  or  for  several  reduced  rates.  As  a  rule  these  are  not 
effective as  an  instrument of distribution policy,  nor are they significant as 
9 3  cf  KEEN  ( 1987),  "Welfare  effects  of  commodity  tax  harmonisation",  Journal 
of Public Economics  33,  pp.  107-114 - 50  -
a  source  of  national  tax  revenue.  Moreover,  in  a  proposal  based  on  the 
exchange  rate  argument  they  make  the  necessary  mechanism  more  difficult  to 
operate;  in  the  case  of  the  other  proposals there is an  incentive for  cross-
border  shopping  in the case of  luxury goods. 
on  systematic grounds it is obviously desirable that the United Kingdom  should 
replace  its  zero  rata  with  a  reduced  rate.  This · would  necessitate  a 
corresponding  reduction  in  direct  taxation  to  offset  the  distributional 
effects.  Since  goods  subject  to  the  reduced  rate  are  not  widely  traded 
internationally or the subject of personal  importation,  the discussion of  zero 
rating in relation to competition is irrelevant. 
The  question of the  level df tax rates is more difficult to answer,  being more 
closely  linked to the  mechanism  involved;  whereas  in the case of the exchange 
rate  mechanism  there  is  no  need  for  coordinated  tax  rate  banda,  serious 
distortions  arise  as  soon  as  one  looks  at  a  value-added  tax  under  complex 
production processes. 
It is doubtful  whether the proposal put  forward  by Fratianni and Christie is a 
viable  alternative.  In  order  to  bring  about  the  required  gross  price 
structure  it  would  be  necessary  to  have  a  large  number  of  tax  rates  which 
would  then  have  to  be  adjusted  simultaneously,  resulting  in  lack  of 
flexibility.  It  cannot  be  assumed  that  setting  a  date  for  the  abolition of 
fiscal  frontiers  would  create  the  necessary  pressure  to  bring  about  pre-
harmonization.  Those  industries·  suffering  windfall-losses  would  not 
necessarily be parties to the negotiations. 
Distortions  would  also persist  as  a  result of  the difficulties in adjustments 
with third countries. 
A  further  question  is  that  of  "perceived  fairness."  If the  origin principle 
were  adopted,  would  producers  in  a  high  tax  country  regard  importe  from  low 
tax  countries  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  exchange  rate  compensation? 
Neutrality  is  not  only  a  question  of  objective  facts  but  also  a  question  of 
perception.  Such  criticisms  cannot  be  levelled at  the  destination principle 
or the common  market  principle. - Sl  -
Under  the  common  market  principle  with  deduction  of  input  tax  and  the 
clearing-house  scheme,_ a  standard tax rate band can be  justified as  a  means  of 
limiting  tax  evasion  and  incentives  for  factor  migration.  A  band  of  6 
percentage points  for the  standard rate is too  narrow if appropriate measures 
.. 
(such  as  greater  cooperation  between  national  tax  authoritiett)  are  taken 
against  tax  evasion  and  special  arrangement&  are  made  to  deal  with  cross-
border  shopping. 
The  deferred  payment  scheme  raises  problema  in  combatting  tax  evasion  and 
would  not  really  abolish  fiscal  frontiers.  The  market-orientated  concept 
proposed  by  the British Government  and  based on  the  DPS  cannot be expected to 
result  in  harmonization  of  tax  rates.  Even  if  there  were  a  degree  of 
adjustment  it  is  not  clear  at  what  point  tax  rates  would  level  off,  which 
makes  it difficult  to  project  the  changes  and  fiscal  effects  for  the  Member 
States which  would  be greater in certain circumstances than with a  coordinated 
adjustment. 
Cross-border  dad~.H~~ion  of  input  t,ax  und-:-·t'l.bte~l~,r  pr~vid~~  the  simplest 
solution  from  a  technical  point  of  view  and  thus  offers effective protection 
against tax evasion.  The  clearing-house system,  which operates technically in 
the  same  way  as the common  market principle,  requires  a  central clearing-house 
and  imposes  an  additional  administrative  burden  on  industry,  although  the 
Commission's  proposals  aim  to  minimize  thts  burden.  The  advantage  of  the 
clearing-house  syste~ is that it is neutral  in terms of  international trade. 
The  origin  principle  would  result '.,in  revenue  sharing  that  would  differ most 
from  the status quo  and  cannot be  j~stified on  normative grounds  since a  large 
proportion  of  the  added  value  occurs  at  the  last  stage  of  production  which 
generally  takes  place  in  the  importing  country.  In  a  single  market  the 
sharing  of  revenue  is  a  ·justifiable  goal.  "In  a  true  economic  union  or 
common  market,  revenue sharing according to the distribution of value added is 
certainly  a  solution which  corresponds with  and  can  therefore be  justified by 
other  goals  of  economic  integration on  which  a  common  market  idea normally is 
based. "94 
94  BIEHL  (1982),  p.  197 - 52  -
This  approach  would  probably  be  unacceptable  pol  it.; r,ally  which  means  that  a 
clearing-house  scheme  of  some  kind  would  be  required to achieve the Community 
internal  market.  The  reason  why  the  clearing-house  scheme  has  not  received 
more  support  from  governments  may  be  a  refusal or reluctanc• on their part to 
accept the abolition of border controls for other,  non-fiscal,  reasons  such as 
combatting terrorism or drug-traf(icking. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  discretionary  taxation  policies,  the  DPS,  the 
clearing-house  scheme,  and,  with  some  reservation,  the  CMP  present  no 
disadvantages  in principle.  All three systems  have the advantage of  impinging 
less  on  the  monetary  sphere  in  so  far  as  the  distortions  under  capital 
mobility  have  no  major  repercussions,  and  they  permit  an  active  tax  rate 
policy.  On  the other  hand,  a  system based on the exchange rate would create a 
constant  interplay with the monetary side of the economy. 
In  conclusion,  cro~s-border deduction  of  input  tax  combined  w~th a  clearing-
house  mechanism  to  redistribute  revenue  gives  rise  to  the  least  distortions 
and  prcblere~  i:1  c~~r"A'~"'i Ann  wit-h  t:h.e  nthAr prn!'Osal  A  and meahanisms. - i  -- ii -
1  (a)  Table  showing the structure and  level of  VAT  in the Member  States(1) 
Reduced Rates  Standard Rate  Increased Rates 
Member  State 
Belgium(2)  1  and  6  19  25  and  33 
FRG  7  14 
Denmark  22 
France  2.1/4/5.5/7  18.6  33  1/3 
Greece  6  18  36 
Ireland  2.4  and  10  25 
Italy  2  and  9  18  38 
Luxembourg  3  and  6  12 
The  Netherlands  6  20 
Portugal  8  16  30 
Spain  6  12  33 
United  Kingdom  15 
Rates  applicable as at 1.4.1987 
(1)  Source:  Commission  of the  European  Communities  (1987a),  Completion of the 
Internal  Market:  approximation  of  indirect  tax  rates  and  harmonization  of 
indirect  tax  structure.  Global  communication  from  the Commission,  COM(87)320 
final,  Brussels,  4.7.1987,  p.9 
(2)  Also  applies  an  intermediate rata of  17\.  For  details of zero rating see 
text. - iii -
(b)  Table  showing the fiscal  impact  of  VAT  in the Member  States(3)  in 1986 
in ' 
Member  State  [1]  [2]  (l] 
----------------------~---------~---------------------------~-~~~~~~--------
Belgium  64.5  23.3  7.0 
FRG  60.6  24.3  5.7 
Denmark  55.1  20.1  9.8 
France  65.2  33.5  8.5 
Greece  37.3  25.2  6.2 
Ireland  47.3  24.3  8.4 
Italy  59.6  22.3  5.3 
Luxembourg  54.5  17.9  5.7 
The  Netherlands  63.5  28.7  7.5 
Portugal(4)  43.8  30.6  6.8 
Spain(4)  56.4  29.6  5.5 
United  Kingdom  50.1  18.9  6.0 
Column  [1]  :  VAT  revenue  (Account  5110)  as  a  percentage  of  indirect tax 
revenue  (Account  5000) 
Column  [2] 
Column  [3] 
VAT  revenue  as  a  percentage  of total tax revenue  (Table  2  and 
Table  36)(5) 
VAT  revenue as  a  percentage of  GOP  (Table  36) 
(3)  Source:  OECD  (1987),  Revenue  statistics of  OECD  Member  Countries,  Paris; 
author's  calculations.  See  also  LEE  et  al  (1988),  p.  45  and  CNOSSEN  (1987), 
'Tax  structure developments'  in Cnossen  (Ed),  Tax  Coordination in the European 
Community,  Deventer,  p.  21.  The  indications  in  brackets  in the explanations 
are references used  in OECD  statistics. 
(4)  Since  Spain  and  Portugal  did  not  join the  Community  until  1986  and  have 
not  yet  changed  over  completely  to  VAT  with  deduction  of  input  tax,  the 
calculations  are  baaed  on  heading  5110  (General  turnover  taxes)  used  in OECD 
Statistics. 
(5)  Contrary to the definition used in OECD  statistics,  in these figures total 
tax  revenue  does  not  include social security levies. - iv -
2  The effect of different tax rates in a  two-country model 
The effects of different tax rates under the origin and destination principles 
are  analysed  here  using  the  following  model6z  There  are  two  countries,  each 
of which  produces the  same  two  goods.  Prices correspond to marginal costs and 
there is perfect competition.  In the initial no-tax aituation,  given the same 
technology,  prices  are  the  same  internationally.  However,  country  A  exports 
only good  1  and country B only good  2. 
The  trade balance between A and  B is thus 
(1)  pl  xl  =  e  p2  x2  A  AB  B 
where  Xi  is country A's  exports  (B's  imports)  of  good  1  and xi  is country B's 
exports  (A's  imports)  of  good  2.  eAB  is  the  exchange  rate  between  A  and  B 
giving the price of  a  unit of country B's currency in terms of that of country 
A. 
Where  the  trade  balance  is  in  equilibrium  and  in the  absence  of taxation,  at 
prices  P1 ,  P2  and  e~ there  are  associated  quantities  xr·  and  x~*,  which 
satisfy  (1). 
Where  a  uniform national tax is levied on the two  goods  and the tax revenue is 
redistributed  lump  sum  to consumers,  the effects are as  follows: 
a.  DESTINATION  PRINCIPLE 
aa.  tax  shifted  forward:  The  border  tax  adjustment  means  that  exports  are 
free  of  the  exporting  country's  tax  and  imports  are taxed  at the tax rate of 
the  importing country on entry,  so that the equilibrium condition 
Pi  Xi  = eAB  P~  X~, 
(P~  where  j=A,B  being  the  price  of  good  i  in  country  j)  will  prevail  and  be 
satisfied with the  same  values.  Producer prices,  when  converted,  are the same 
internationally 
6 
for  i=1,2. 
This  model  combines,  in  an  amended  form,  the  models  of  WHALLEY  (1979)  and 
BERGLAS  (1981).  The  same  supply and  demand elasticities are still assumed. - v  -
However,  where  the  tax  rates  in  A  and  B  are  different,  consumer  prices  in  A 
and  B vary 
Pi  (l+tA)  +  e~ P~  (l+t8 ) 
ab.  tax  shifted  backwardsz  Producer  prices  fall  by  the  factor  11 (  l+tj) 
j=A,B,  so that the equilibrium condition for the trade balance is given by 
(2)  £Pi 1  (l+tA)]  xl •  a;;  [P~ I  (l+t8)]  x~. 
A tax is non-distortive if,  for  unchanged quantities xl*  and  x~*,  equation  (2) 
is satisfied.  This is the caae where 
**  (l+tg)  *  I  (l+tA)•  eAB  •  eAB 
Where  tA +  tB  consumer prices again vary 
pi  A +  **  eAB  pi 
B  for i•l,2 
b.  ORIGIN  PRINCIPLE 
ba.  tax shifted forward:  In the absence of border tax adjustments,  consumer 
prices which enter in the trade balance equation must  be balanced out 
(3)  P!  (l+tA)  x! •  e;;  P~  (l+t8 )  X~ 
For  unchanged  quantities  xl*  and  x~·  the  equilibrium  condition will  hold  if 
there is an  adjustment  in the exchange rate 
e; =  ( l+tA)  e~ I  (  l+t8 ). 
Where  tA  i  t 8  producer prices are no  longer identical internationally 
pi + **  pi  A  eAB  B  for  i  = 1,2 
bb.  tax  shifted  backwards  1  Here  too  producer  prices  fall  by  the  factor 
1/(l+tj)  j•A,B,  although  under  the  origin  principle  gross  prices  are used  in 
the trade balance equation.  The equilibrium condition is thus given by 
(4) 
which  has  the  same  structure  as  (l)  and  is satisfied for  the  same  quantities 
**  *  +  where  eAB  = eAB"  Producer prices again vary where  tA  t 8 
Pi I  (l+tA)  + e;;  P~ I  (l+t8 )  for  i  =  1,2 - vi -
3  Bffects  of  a  switch  from  the  destination  principle  to  the  origin 
principle 
The  four  variants  discussed  in  Section  2  show  that  a  switch  from  the 
destination to the origin principle is possible given a  corresponding exchange 
rate  adjustment.  Where  tax  is  shifted  forwards,  the  trade  balance  equation 
under  the  destination  principle  corresponds  exactly to equation  (l)  and  thus 
to  the  initial  non-tax  situation  or  that  prior  to  the  introduction  of  the 
origin  principle.  The  switch  is  thus  reflected  in  the  exchange  rate 
adjustment,  as  shown  in ba. 
Where  tax  is  shifted  backwards,  under  the  destination principle the  exchange 
rate  adjusted  to  bring  about  equilibrium  balance  of  trade  - made  up  of 
producer prices.  This  means  that where tax rates vary the balance of trade is 
no  longer  in equilibrium after a  switch'to the origin principle 
Pi xi*+  (l+t8 )  (e~ I  (l+tA)J  P~ x;•. 
since  it  is  known  from  the  equilibrium  conditions  in  the  no  tax  situation 
that 
Pl  xl  a  *  p2  x2 
A  A  8 AB  B  s• 
The  equilibrium condition is satisfied where the exchange rate adjusts to 
The  exchange  rate  thus  reverts  to  exactly  what  it  was  in  the  initial 
situation. - vii -
4  The distribution of tax revenue under the common  market principle 
To  evaluate  the distribution of tax  revenue  under  the  common  market principle 
with  deduction  of  input  tax,  the  following  simple  two-country  modal  has  been 
assumed:  each  country  taxes  exports  to the  other country  and  domestic  added 
value,  incorporating  foreign  added  value  from  imports.  However,  since 
domestic  producers can deduct the input tax on  imports,  the latter generate no 
revenue  for  the domestic  tax authorities.  The  revenue  of  the two countries A 
and  B is thus 
TA  =  (VAB  +  V8A +  VA)  tA  - V 8AtB  and 
TB  =  (VBA  +  VAB  +  VB)  ta - VABtA. 
were  Vjk:  is the value  added of country j's exports to country k;  j,k •  A,B, 
j  + k 
Vj:  value  added  in country  j 
tj: tax rate in country  j 
Tj:  tax  revenue of country  j 
(a)  What  is  the  distribution  of  revenue  if  a  product  with  a  net  value  V  is 
produced  internationally  under  the  common  market  principle?  The  product  is 
sold in A  and the total tax revenue  is 
T = TA  +  T8  =  V tA  = (VA  + V 8A)  tA. 
The  tax  revenue of  B  and  A  is thus 
T8  =  V8A  t 8  and  TA  =  T  - T8  =- (VA  + V 8A)  tA  - V 8A  t 8 • 
The  ratio is thus: 
---------------------------- - - 1 
+  1  )  1. ; - viii -
The  revenue  ratio is thus determined by the value  added ratio and the tax rate 
ratio.  For the specific case tA  •  t 8 ,  the distribution of  revenue corresponds 
to the respective value  added  (VA/V8A). 
(b)  We  now  turn to the  change  in  revenue  compared to the existing deatination 
principle,  in  other  words  under  what  condition&· will  the ,tax  revenue  of 
country  A under  the  Common  Market  Principle be  at least as great as under the 
destination principle?  Where  revenue under the destination principle is 
T*  - v  t  + v  t  A  BA  A  A  A' 
This  is the case where 
t  > 
A 
the problem is thus 
and if the balance of trade is in equilibrium 
(c)  Given  tA  <  t 8 ,  how  great  must  A's  trade  surplus be  for its tax revenue to 
be  the  same  as  under  the  present  destination  principle?  It is  assumed  that 
V 8A is constant  and  that only  VAB  varies.  The  export surplus is expressed by 
the parameter  ~- Then 
VAB  =  ~ vBA'  where  f3  >  1  and V 8A  •  constant. 
If this equation is substituted in  (b)  and  solved for  f3  it yields 
f3  > 
A's exports must  exceed B's exports by the inverse tax rate ratio. - ix -
5  The  effect of  different  tax rat- in the caae of  a  awitch to the ca.on 
Market Principle and a  Clearing-Bouae acbame 
(a)  Common  Market  Principle with deduction of  input tax 
Let  us  again  take  the  two-country  model  from  Section  2  with  tax  shifted 
forward.  In this case the  current destination principle was  characterized by 
neutrality  as  regards  equilibrium of  the  trade  balance  and  the  same  producer 
prices.  The  border  tax  adjustment  meant  that  in  the  case  of  an  unchanged 
exchange rate  e~ both these conditione were satisfied. 
The  introduction  of  a  tax  baaed  on  the  Common  Market  Principle  or  a  switch 
from  the  destination  principle  to the  Common  Market  Principle with  different 
tax  rates  in A  and  B  means  that  producer  prices  remain the same  but the trade 
balance equation does  not. 7 
The  trade balance equation is now 
Pi  (l+tA)  Xi  •  eAB  P~ (l+t8 )  X~ 
•  The  (unchanged)  equilibrium  exchange  rate  eAB,  which  gave  the  same  producer 
prices  under  the  destination  principle,  cannot  however  satisfy  both  this 
condition  and  the  new  balance  of  trade  equation  for  different  tax  rates  and 
unchanged  quantities 
quantities must  adjust. 
(b)  The  Clearing-House 
and  X2* 
8  •  Given  a  constant  exchange  rate,  the 
In  contrast to the  Common  Market  Principle with  deduction of  input tax,  under 
the  Clearing-House  there  is  a  calculation  of  claims  in respect  of  imports  on 
which  foreign tax  has  been paid.  Thus  country A would  be required to transfer 
to B taxes  amounting to 
(1)  tA  Pi  Xi 
Conversely,  it would  receive  from  B taxes amounting to 
( 2 )  eAB  t 8  P~  X~. 
The  net  amount  received  or  paid  by  A  is the  difference  between  (2)  and  (1). 
If the Clearing-House  system is neutral,  given an unchanged exchange rate e~ 
<J" 
7  Only  imports  made  by  registered taxpayers  have  been  taken  into account  so 
that the Destination and  Common  Market  Principles are comparable. - X  -
and  quantities  xi*  and  x~*,  the  balance  of  payments  must  be  restored  to 
equilibrium.  Substitution of  (1)  and  (2)  in the balance of payments gives 
Pi  (l+tA)  xi*+ e:S  t 8  Pi xi*  - tA  Pi xi*  •  •:S  P~  (l+t8 )  ~·. 
Multiplying out  and collecting terms gives the original equilibrium namely 
Pl  xl*  •  p2  x2* 
A  A  =  eAB  B  B  • 
The  Clearing-House mechanism is thus neutral regarding international trade and 
the balance of payments. DPS 
CMP 
A, 
w 
i 
j, 
tj 
pi 
xi 
J 
eAB 
Tj 
vj 
vjk 
B 
k 
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